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## ARTICLE I.

### SALEM WITCHCRAFT.\*

THE story of Salem witchcraft has at length been clearly and ably told. The nebulous obscurity which has hitherto invested the subject has been resolved by the historian's labors into certain, definite facts of knowledge. Having read with carefulness both volumes of Mr. Upham's work, and reflecting upon their contents after we have laid them down, we think it but just to say that he has performed his labor remarkably well. Though the story he relates is one of the most maddening in its details and incidents that was ever given to historian to tell, and one cannot read it without having his heart burn with fiercest indignation, yet he tells it with calmness, fairness and charity.

Unless his readers are possessed of great self-control, they cannot help frequently breaking out into exclamations of wrath—clenching their fists in anger, and sometimes giving vent to pent up feelings of excitement by springing to their feet and walking the floor. But throughout the whole record of folly, wickedness, stupidity and cruelty, the author retains his composure.

\* Salem Witchcraft, with an Account of Salem Village, and a History of Opinions on Witchcraft and Kindred Subjects. By Charles W. Upham. In two volumes.

The mockery of trials, in which the poor innocent victims had not the slightest chance of acquittal, because of the persuasion of their guilt which existed in the minds of judges, jury and the excited crowds which filled the court-rooms; the manifest unfairness with which those trials were conducted,—manifest, though the only records of them which we have are derived from those hostile to the accused,—the outrages perpetrated upon them by loading their aged, infirm bodies with heavy chains, and crowding them in loathsome prisons; the brutal and indecent examinations to which their persons were subjected, to discover the witch-mark, and the final scene on Gallows Hill, where the sickening farce culminates in judicial murder,—all these things are recounted with unruffled equanimity and fairness. Though he expresses condemnation where it is plainly due, it is expressed without heat; and where excuse or palliation is admissible, the author makes it.

This calm, dispassionate spirit, combined with the thoroughness with which the work has been done, makes these volumes a valuable contribution to our New England history.

It is interesting to note how the work originated. Some thirty-five or thirty-seven years ago, the author, then a young man, recently settled in the ministry at Salem, delivered a course of lectures to his fellow-townsmen upon the subject of that witchcraft delusion which had made the town so widely and unhappily celebrated.

These lectures were so favorably received that they were published. They went through two or three editions. In preparing them for publication, and in revising them for each new edition, he added what information farther research and discovery had placed in his hands. This supplementary matter grew to be so voluminous, and threw such new light upon the subject, (light which changed the whole aspect of the affair, and contradicted, in many respects, the impression contained in the original lectures,) that the author resolved to suppress the book, or let it go out of print, and write the history anew from the beginning. To this work he has principally devoted himself

ever since. Thus those few early lectures, written as the by-play of his leisure hours, amidst the work of his profession, grew at length into the chief employment of his life.

His sources of information have been the reports of depositions and trials kept on record at the clerk of court's office in Salem, the records of deeds and wills preserved in the archives of the county, the parish and church records of the Salem Village Church, and of the First Church, Salem, the acts of the General Court, and the writings of Cotton Mather, Caleph and Hutchinson. These have been so thoroughly explored, and the information they contained so clearly brought out, that the times and people of which they treat are completely restored to us.

With their help the author has furnished us a map of the region, on which the original grants are all marked out, and the places where the different people of Salem Village lived and had their farms, whose names appear in the story of the witchcraft delusion. With the help of this we are able to-day to identify each spot and view every interesting locality. The main points in the history and the distinguishing features in the characters of individuals and families are also restored to us, so that we gain a very vivid and truthful conception of their manner of life, society, conduct and habits.

Sir Walter Scott, we venture to say, does not more plainly and truthfully bring back to our minds the life and people of mediæval times than does Mr. Upham, the life and people of Salem Village as they were in 1692.

But it is time we began our account of the contents of his work. The first volume consists of two parts. The first part is occupied with the story of Salem Village previous to the outbreak of the witchcraft delusion, gives an account of its settlement, a brief description of the chief inhabitants and their families, the circumstances of its erection into a distinct parish, and the state of the community under each successive minister.

It may be necessary to say a few words of the location of Salem Village. It may not be known to all that it was not the same as Salem Town, or what is now known as Salem. It comprised

what now is embraced in the two towns of Danvers and Peabody, with parts of Beverly, Middletown and Topsfield.

Danvers Centre, where Rev. C. B. Rice is now settled, was about the centre of the village. There the meeting-house stood, near the site of the present one. Near it was the parsonage, and the hospitable residence of Nathaniel Ingersoll. The first church, now ministered to by Rev. C. B. Rice, and by Dr. Milton Braman, before him, is in fact the original church of Salem Village, organized in 1689.

Why this region, so far remote from Salem Town, came to be called Salem Village, is explained by an order of the General Court passed November 5, 1639. The order is in these words: "Whereas the inhabitants of Salem have agreed to plant a village near the river that runs to Ipswich, (Ipswich River,) it is ordered that all the lands near their bounds between Salem and the said river, not belonging to any other town or person by any former grant, shall belong to the said village."

In other words, the inhabitants of Salem, overflowing the limits of their town, and settling the wilderness beyond as far as Ipswich River, were allowed to call the settlement which resulted, Salem Village. It was also sometimes called Salem Farms. Until organized into a separate parish, they were regarded as belonging to the parish of Salem. They paid rates to it, and attended worship there. But, by reason of the distance, this attendance must have been somewhat irregular and uncertain, and the need was felt by the settlers of the village of having a church and ministry of their own among them. When they were numerous enough and sufficiently able, they accordingly petitioned the court to be allowed to form a parish, build a meeting-house, and have a minister for themselves. In their petition they expressed the fear that unless their request were granted they should soon become, for the lack of the ministrations of the Gospel among them, "worse than the heathen."

But what they desired so much, and justly regarded as a blessing, proved a source of discord and unhappiness. "The establishment of the ministry among them," says Mr. Upham,



"was not merely an opening of Pandora's box—it was emptying and shaking it over their heads. It led them to a condition of bitterness and violence, of confusion and convulsion, of horror and misery, of cruelty and outrage, worse than heathen ever experienced or savages inflicted." The reason why the establishment of the ministry among them was attended with results so disastrous, is to be found, partly, we think, in the peculiar nature of the religious organization with which it was associated. "It was a congregation forbidden, for the time being, to have a church. It was a society for religious worship, administered, not by professors of religion, or by persons regarded at all in a religious light, but by householders." It was a sort of dependent colony of the Salem Town Church. The professors of religion in it were members of that church, and the town church reserved to itself the right of nominating the pastors until such time as a church should be formed there in connection with the society. This state of vassalage continued eighteen years, or until the society was with its fourth minister, Mr. Parris, who will be found taking a chief part in the witchcraft proceedings. This power of nomination was retained by the mother church to guard against an unsound ministry. But its exercise was attended with disaster to the flock which it was designed to protect.

It was an occasion of dissension among them, which began with the very first minister who came. His name was James Bayley. He was from Newbury, and a graduate of Harvard in the class of 1669. He came to Salem Village in 1671. Several persons of considerable influence in the village were dissatisfied with the manner in which he was brought forward, and became prejudiced against him. The feeling was not removed, but deepened and spread, until the community was rent with bitter, violent animosities. After endeavoring in vain to conciliate those implacable opposers, at the end of seven years Mr. Bayley left the place and the work of the ministry, settling as a physician in a neighboring town. As far as we can learn, he was a good man, and a faithful, able minister. His successor was

George Burroughs. He encountered, as might be expected, the dislike of those who had been the friends of Mr. Bayley, and who, angry because of his forced departure, were resolved to be pleased with no one who might come after him, especially if he happened in any wise to suit the opposite party.

After enduring the storm for two years—in which time he lost his wife, and suffered almost every trial that a man in such a position can suffer, from coldness, insults, and salary unpaid—he left, despairing of being able to effect any good among them. His character, as revealed in his bearing at this time and afterwards, was that of an upright, devoted man, singularly unselfish and pure-hearted, and of true, unaffected piety. And the impression we unavoidably receive is that he was shamefully and outrageously abused by the people of Salem Village, antecedently to being accused and arrested for witchcraft; and that the sufferings, insults, and tragical death which he suffered on that account, make his life one of the saddest ever recorded.

The next minister who came to Salem Village was Deodat Lawson. His coming was in the year 1684. He was a man of decided genius and learning. But the troubled waters of dissension had not settled to such smoothness as to make it advisable for him to remain there long. Disgusted by their quarrelling, and saddened also at the death of his wife and daughter, which occurred there, he left after a two years' trial.

Then came Samuel Parris, who received a call in November, 1688. Instead of giving an immediate answer, he delayed it, upon some trifling pretext or other, month after month, until the following spring, being desirous to make as good and sharp a bargain as possible. He was, as it seems, a selfish, scheming, foolish man.

Had he been willing, at the first, heartily and sincerely to give himself to his work, as a true minister of the Gospel should have done, he might have enjoyed a peaceful and useful ministry, for the people were greatly sickened by their dissensions, and longed for quietness and harmony.

They had welcomed him with almost entire unanimity, and

were ready to give him a cordial support. But he preferred to palter with them, and did it so long and with such apparent selfishness, that many became disgusted. Old feuds broke out with fresh violence; and the opportunity for him to do any good in Salem Village passed away, never to return. He settled with them, however, if not to be a minister for good, yet a minister of terrible evil. At the time of his settlement, in the autumn of 1689, a church was organized, seventeen or eighteen years after the organization of the parish and the setting up of the ministry there. Ambitious to be a landholder, he tried, by shrewd management, to get possession of the parsonage house and land; that is, to have them turned over to him for his own property. The party opposed to this seemed to be gaining strength, and fast bearing him down, when the witchcraft excitement began.

This preliminary history of parish affairs is thought necessary to a clear understanding of the witchcraft business, as showing that an excited state of mind existed in the community, which rendered it more likely to be a prey to any such delusion, and especially to suffer terrible things from it, when converted by wicked hands into an instrument of revenge and retaliation. Other causes, besides these parish troubles, had conspired to plant the seeds of bitterness and hate in that ill-fated community. When the towns of Topsfield and Beverly were created, their boundaries were made, through the carelessness of the General Court, to encroach upon the territory of Salem Village. The inhabitants of the latter were a good deal stirred up by the consequences which followed. They were called upon to pay parish and town rates to Topsfield. Upon their refusal to do so, constables and tax-collectors were sent to make the obnoxious levy by force. They were resisted and defied, and thus many fierce strifes arose. Topsfield settlers also went so far as to dispute the titles given by Salem, and to claim for their town commons, lands belonging to people of Salem Village, and to forbid, as a trespass, their owners cutting off wood from them. This, of course, led to trouble, and the woods sometimes

resounded with angry voices and blows of men at strife, as well as with the sound of the woodman's axe and the crash of falling trees. Another source of exasperation, which is supposed to have had some influence in increasing the horrors of the witchcraft business, was the occurrence of some fiercely contested lawsuits, which grew out of the uncertain manner in which the original grant to the first settlers of the village had been defined ; in consequence of which, one was found to overlap and entrench upon another.

The first part of Mr. Upham's work is occupied with the details of these various matters, and with brief biographies or accounts of persons comprising the population of the village. It is preliminary to the witchcraft story, and necessary to a clear understanding of it.

The same thing may be said of the second part, occupying the latter portion of the first volume. It is taken up with an account of the witchcraft superstition as it then existed in the minds of men. It tells us what a witch or wizard was, according to the popular belief ; how they were supposed to afflict people ; by what tokens they might be known—in short, it gives us a *resumé* of the doctrines of witchcraft. It declares, also, that it was believed in, not merely by the ignorant and superstitious, but by the wisest, best and most enlightened people of that age and the ages just preceding. The names of Luther and Melancthon, Bishop Jewell, Baxter, Calamy, Lord Bacon, Sir Thomas Brown, Sir Matthew Hale, and others, are mentioned as among its firm believers, and their words are cited in proof of the fact.

An interesting trial is spoken of as occurring in England in the time of Sir Matthew Hale, at which he was the presiding judge. At this trial two females, whose names are given, were convicted of witchcraft, and afterwards executed ; and it is thought that the thing which led to their condemnation was the opinion of Sir Thomas Brown, who, happening to be present, was called to the stand, and gave his testimony in support of the reality of witchcraft. The weight of his great name,

thrown into the wavering scale, decided the case, and sent the unfortunate accused to the gallows. Where such eminent names agreed in support of the superstition, where the voice of the clergy was almost universally on that side, and the law counted witchcraft a capital crime, and learned treatises upon it existed in every library, it must not be deemed strange that the masses of the people fell in with and accepted it as a solemn verity.

It accorded with the intense supernaturalism of those times. Though an enlightened interpretation discovers no real foundation for it in the Bible, yet it was the belief of the church everywhere at that time—a belief which grew up in the middle ages—that the Bible clearly taught it, and commanded its stern punishment. The doctrines concerning it were fashioned by monkish theologians, who were very fond of weaving fictions concerning the Devil and his work.

It will help us if we make a brief statement of the leading doctrines of witchcraft as held at that time. A witch, according to the received notion, was a person in solemn league with Satan. She, by a deliberate compact, agreed to be his faithful servant, and do all in her power to defeat the ends of religion and ruin the souls of men. And he, in consideration of such service, agreed to exert his supernatural agency in her behalf, and to endue her with certain extraordinary powers for evil. She was believed to be able, through this compact, to afflict, torment and destroy whomsoever she chose. "She could cause them to pine away, throw them into the most frightful convulsions, choke, bruise, pierce and craze them,—subject them to every description of pain, disease, torture, and even to death itself."

A witch was believed to possess the faculty of being present in her shape or apparition at a different place, however distant, from that which her body actually occupied. It was also supposed that she could transform herself, for the better execution of her infernal purposes, into the shape of some animal,—as dog, cat, hog, rat, mouse, toad or spider. She had imps also in

her service, which were supposed to bear the likeness of some insect. It was also believed that witches had the power of torturing their victims at any distance, by means of puppets. They could make a doll, or image, and will it to represent the person they wished to injure; then whatever they did to it—pinch it, prick it, or snip it with scissors—was felt by the person represented by it. They also had the power of riding through the air on a pole or broomstick. Often two or three are represented by testimony quoted in Mr. Upham's story, as having been transported together in this manner from one place to another. It was believed to be done very swiftly—almost instantaneously.

As there is a sacrament of the Lord, of which Christians partake, so there was supposed to be a Devil's sacrament, of which witches partook. It was celebrated in lonely pastures, and out of the way places; and the witches were summoned to it by a horn, whose wild blast, audible to them only, rang out far and wide, so as to be heard throughout the whole country round about. The signs of witches were, first, a witch-mark, generally of the shape of a teat, with which they were supposed to suckle their imps; secondly, an inability to weep; thirdly, a power of floating on the water; and, fourthly, an evil eye, whose glance was more or less harmful. The law provided specifically for the detection of the witch-mark.

A jury of the same sex made a minute examination of the body. They would pierce it with pins; and if, as might have been expected, particularly in aged persons, any spot were found insensible to feeling, or if any excrescence, induration or discoloration was discovered, it was regarded as visible, indubitable evidence of guilt.

Such were the doctrines of witchcraft as held two hundred years ago by our forefathers. A moment's consideration will show how little chance of acquittal there was in the case of one accused of being a witch. Mr. Upham truthfully says, that "Where judicial tribunals countenanced the popular credulity in these notions (and the judges seem to have shared in it to the fullest extent,) there was no security for innocence and no

escape from wrong. The clearest proof of absence availed nothing. For it might be alleged that the accused was present, and acted through his apparition; or that he was there in the likeness of some animal; or that, though absent, he injured his victims by means of an imp or a puppet."

It will be easily seen what an instrument for the gratification of malice and revenge the existence of such a wide-spread, generally received superstition would afford in a time of great excitement to one inclined to use it. To a person situated as Parris, the minister of Salem Village was, with waning popularity and a growing opposition which was steadily bearing him down, it would suggest an effectual method of getting rid of his enemies. And in a community like that which for a quarter of a century had been rent by fierce dissensions and strife, and was therefore filled with resentments and bitterness, it was likely to operate with terrible effect. We are now ready to enter upon the sad story of its ravages in that ill-fated community.

During the winter of 1691-2, a circle of young girls, of ages ranging all the way from eight to eighteen or twenty years, were in the habit of meeting at Mr. Parris's house for the purpose of practising palmistry, and other arts of fortune-telling, and of becoming skilled in the mysteries of magic and soothsaying. Most prominent among these girls were a niece of Mr. Parris named Abigail Williams, Ann, daughter of Thomas Putnam, the parish clerk, and Mercy Lewis and Mary Warren, servant girls, the one in the family of Thomas Putnam, and the other in that of John Procter. Mr. Parris had a daughter among them; but she was early removed by her father from the scene, and sent away to a distance. This company, from the extreme youth of those composing it, and on account of their supposed sufferings, received the name of the "afflicted children."

Besides these, there were engaged in the business two colored servants belonging to Mr. Parris, whom he had brought to the village from the West Indies, and three married women, the most prominent among whom was Mrs. Ann Putnam, wife of the Thomas Putnam, the parish clerk, and mother of the child Ann,



above spoken of. In the course of the winter, this company of persons became quite expert in the arts they were learning, and gradually began to exhibit their skill to the astonishment and wonder of those witnessing it.

"At first," says Mr. Upham, "they made no charges against any person, but confined themselves to strange actions, exclamations and contortions. They would put themselves in odd and unnatural postures, make wild and antic gestures, and utter incoherent and unintelligible sounds. They would be seized with spasms, drop insensible to the floor, or writhe in agony, suffering dreadful tortures, and uttering loud and piercing outcries." Report of these things soon got abroad into the neighborhood and surrounding country, and created much speculation as to the nature and cause of the strange sufferings of the afflicted children.

No explanation was given, and they grew steadily worse. At length, the village physician was called in, a formal consultation was held, and the opinion gravely pronounced that the children were bewitched. The children did not confine their acting to private houses—they carried it into the sanctuary, and often seriously disturbed the services of the Lord's Day by their outcries, fits, and strange, wild demeanor. They were supposed to be under some irresistible, demoniac impulse, and therefore were tolerated in their disturbances. Some of the people, however, discountenanced them, and stayed away from meeting rather than put up with them. It was subsequently remarked that whoever did this were noticed and made to suffer a terrible punishment. After a while, the neighboring ministers, to the number of a dozen or so, were called in by Mr. Parris to witness the strange phenomena, and to spend the day in fasting and prayer that this sudden manifestation of Satanic rage might be stayed. They were completely deluded, and fell in unani-  
mously with the opinion that had been given by the village physician, that the children were under the malignant power of the Devil. This judgment was speedily noised abroad, and the excitement rose to a very great pitch. Men left their work in

the fields, and women their household employments, to witness these awful disclosures of diabolical wrath.

It was an established doctrine of theology and law that the Devil could not operate upon mortals except through the intermediate agency of human beings in confederacy with him—that is, witches or wizards. The question, therefore, which immediately arose, and was upon all lips, was, “Who are the agents of the Devil in this matter? There must be witches among us helping him torment these girls, and who are they?” For some time the girls forbore to accuse anybody; but when the excitement seemed to have reached the right point, they opened their lips and began to choose and denounce their victims. The persons first selected and accused were of such a character as readily secured the popular assent to the charge. One was a poor vagrant in the community; another an unhappy, miserable woman, who had suffered somewhat from the tongue of scandal on account of an ill-starred second marriage; and the third was one of Mr. Parris’s West Indian slaves, whose savage origin, broken speech and weird appearance made her seem to be a fit agent of the Devil.

Warrants against these persons were issued the 29th of February, 1692. From that time to October following, the work of accusing, examination and commitment to prison for final trial and execution, if found guilty, went on. During that time, society became almost completely disorganized by fear and excitement.

The first victims having been promptly arrested, examined and condemned, with the approbation of all, the afflicted children ventured to strike higher. The persons next accused were taken from a more respectable class, and were of the best reputation for piety and social standing. None were spared on account of wealth or known purity of life. Such was the infatuation of the public mind, and so entire was the confidence reposed in the testimony of the afflicted children, that a charge of witchcraft made by them was equivalent to a conviction.

Of the whole number accused, amounting to one hundred and fifty or two hundred persons, only one or two cases of discharge

from custody occurred, on the ground of the charge not being sustained. From the manner in which the trials were conducted, this was not so strange. The persons accused were arrested and brought into court, and there confronted by the afflicted children who had denounced them.

These not only alleged against them past instances of injury, but there, in the presence of the court, fell into fits and convulsions, in which they writhed and made the most distressing outcries, as if suffering extreme agony, and charged the accused with being the cause of their sufferings.

They pretended that the apparitions of the accused—visible only to themselves—leaped upon them even while the trial was in progress, and choked and pricked and beat them; and while giving their testimony against the accused, the children acted so as to confirm this. They gazed earnestly and fearfully into vacancy, as if beholding the apparitions of which they spoke. Their depositions were interrupted by convulsions and fits of insensibility, which they alleged were produced by the prisoners endeavoring, through their apparitions, to prevent them from bearing evidence; and sometimes the proceedings of the court were very much disturbed by these things. They sometimes pretended that they could see the Devil, in the form of a black man, whispering in the ears of the accused, or in the shape of a yellow bird perched upon their shoulders. The judges, and the people who filled the court, instead of regarding these assertions and convulsions as the effects of hallucination or deliberate fraud, received them as indubitable truth. One or two extracts from the reports of examinations and trials, that have been handed down to us, will show how little chance those accused had of clearing themselves.

We will first make an extract from the examination of Rebecca Nurse, whose case is one of the most remarkable, from the respectable social position she held, and the evident amiability and piety of her character. At the time she was accused by the girls, she was confined to her house by sickness and the infirmities of age. Some of her friends getting knowledge of

the charge made against her, visited her a day or two before her arrest.

How little ground there was for the accusation brought against her, is evident from the report they gave of this visit at her trial.

In that report she appears to have been a humble, pious woman. She spoke with pity of the sufferings of the afflicted children, and declared that she "went to God for them."

When informed that she had been denounced for a witch, "Well," she said, "if it be so, the will of the Lord be done." She then sat still awhile, in apparent amazement, and then she said, "Well, as to this thing, I am as innocent as the child unborn; but, surely, what sin hath God found out in me, unrepented of, that he should lay *such* an affliction upon me in my old age?"

This aged woman, whose conversation and bearing were so saintlike, was arrested and brought before the magistrate for examination, which took place in the village meeting-house.

The magistrate began the proceedings by addressing one of the afflicted:—

"What do you say? Have you seen this woman hurt you?" *Ans.* "Yes. She beat me this morning." Addressing another of the afflicted, he said, "Abigail, have you been hurt by this woman?" *Ans.* "Yes." At that point Ann Putnam fell into a grievous fit, and while in her spasms cried out that it was Rebecca Nurse who was thus afflicting her. As soon as Ann's fit was over and order restored, the magistrate said, "Goody Nurse, here are two—Ann Putnam, the child, and Abigail Williams—complain of your hurting them. What do you say to it?" *Ans.* "I can say, before my eternal Father, I am innocent, and God will clear my innocency." *Mag.* "It is very awful to all to see these agonies, and you, an old professor, thus charged with contracting with the Devil by the effects of it, and yet to see you stand with dry eyes where there are so many wet." *Ans.* "You do not know my heart." *Mag.* "What uncertainty there may be in apparitions, I know not; yet this with me strikes hard upon you, that you are at this very present charged with familiar spirits. This is your bodily person they speak to. They say now they see these familiar spirits come to your bodily person. Now what do you say to that?" *Ans.* "I have none, sir." *Mag.* "Have you any familiarity with these spirits?" *Ans.* "No. I have none but with God alone." On every motion of the prisoner's body fits followed upon the complainants, abundantly and frequently. The magistrate, wholly convinced of the reality

of these sufferings, said to her, "Is it not an unaccountable case that when you are examined these persons are afflicted?" Seeing that he and the whole assembly put faith in the accusers, her only reply was, "I have got nobody to look to but God."—*Vol. II., p. 61.*

Giles Corey was another very prominent victim of the delusion. His examination, preliminary to being committed to prison for trial, occurred April 19 in the village meeting-house. The girls acted their usual part, charging him, one by one, with having afflicted them, and proving it on the spot by tortures and sufferings. The magistrates lost all control of themselves, and flew into a passion, exclaiming, "What, is it not enough to act witchcraft at other times, but must you do it now in the face of authority!" The prisoner's only reply was, "I am a poor creature, and cannot help it." (*Vol. II., p. 122.*) Upon his moving his head, the children had their heads and necks afflicted. "One of his hands was let go from confinement, and several were afflicted. He held his head on one side, and then the heads of several of the afflicted were held on one side. He drew in his cheeks, and the cheeks of some of the afflicted were sucked in." The fact that every act and motion of the prisoners were thus instantly reflected, as it were, in the accusing children, by contortions which bore a hideous resemblance, seemed to clearly prove that the prisoners exercised an evil power over them.

Another fact, which was thought to indicate the same thing, was that when the children were thrown into fits, and fell down insensible, they were at once revived and restored upon being brought near to the accused, and having him touch them. In this way they thought the evil influence, or Devil's fluid, as they sometimes called it, which had afflicted the witnesses, passed back into the person of the witch, and they recovered.

These extracts from the examinations of two persons will afford an idea of the character of all. There was no chance for the poor prisoners. They were condemned from the beginning. Or if the magistrates had any feelings of impartiality at the outset, they were soon banished by the spectral evidence of

the accusing witnesses. One or two had but to fall into spasms and contortions, and cry out with their associates that it was caused by the apparition of the prisoner falling upon and choking, or otherwise distressing them, and the evidence was deemed complete. The examinations before the Romish Inquisition were not more unfair, and contrary to every principle of justice, than were the examinations of those charged with witchcraft. The feelings of indignation and wrath which are excited in us as we read the former, are paralleled only by the emotions which stir us in reading the latter. The only relief that is afforded in either case is found in the heroic, Christian manner in which the victims of a false and cruel accusation bore themselves. They might easily have escaped if they had been willing to confess that they were guilty of the charge laid against them, and shown signs of repentance. Many, to save their lives, did this. But those who suffered the extreme penalty refused to purchase life at the price of such falsehood. Conscious of their innocence, and abhorring as much as any the awful crime alleged against them, they would not belie themselves, and outrage their consciences by owning a guilt of which they were as free as an unborn child. At their trials, when maligned and ill-treated in such a way as destroys all our composure to think of, they maintained an unruffled serenity and patience. When convicted, and under sentence of death, some of them, with a refinement of cruelty which seems to us horrible, were brought into the churches on the Sabbath day, and publicly excommunicated. This, under their circumstances, was equivalent to being formally handed over to perdition and the Devil.

This last stroke of unkindness, coming from those who claimed to act in the name of Him who is the only hope of the soul, calculated to shut out every ray of comfort and hope to one whose life was ending in the gloom of a judicial death for what was regarded as the worst of crimes; calculated also to suggest horrible doubts as to whether they were not really guilty of what they had been accused—this last cruel blow from a quarter where comfort was to be looked for, if anywhere, was

received with mute, unanswering silence. And when they died a felon's death, it was with such tokens of a Christian spirit that we are astonished at the blindness which saw only proofs of diabolism in it all. It would seem, however, as though a gleam of truth did now and then find its way into the minds of the people. At the execution of the unfortunate George Burroughs, the second minister of Salem Village, who was accused by the afflicted children while he was pursuing the laborious life of a missionary in the vicinity of Casco Bay, was apprehended and hurried to Salem, without knowing the crime for which he was arrested, was there insulted and outraged with the mockery of a trial like that we have described, and then thrown into a dungeon and loaded with fetters, until he was led out to be hung for a wizard on Gallows Hill,—at his execution, his bearing was so noble and Christianly that there was a murmur in the crowd of spectators indicating a belief that he had been unjustly dealt with. But Cotton Mather, who was present, turned back the rising tide of reason and better feeling by haranguing the people in a speech which justified the action of the magistrates, by defaming the characters of the accused, and asserting the reality of witchcraft.

Every story of blood, however, has a conclusion, and all delusions an end. The end of this one came at length. Mr. Upham thinks it was brought about by the audacity of the accusers, which emboldened them to cry out against persons too high even for them to bring down. They cried out against the wife of Sir William Phips, the governor, and also against a member of the family of Increase Mather, president of Harvard College, and against the mother of the wife of one of the judges. "The accusers," says Mr. Upham, "in aiming at such characters, overestimated their power; and the tide turned against them." But what finally and completely broke the spell by which they had held the minds of the whole colony in bondage, was the accusation, in October, of Mrs. Hale, the wife of the minister of the first church in Beverly. "Her genuine and distinguished virtues had won for her a reputation, and secured

+ See Page 289



in the hearts of the people a confidence which superstition itself could not sully nor shake. The whole community became convinced that the accusers, in crying out against Mrs. Hale, had perjured themselves, and from that moment their power was destroyed. The awful delusion was dispelled, and a close put to one of the most tremendous tragedies in human life." But this close was not brought about until twenty persons had suffered the penalty of death, and the prisons and jails were crowded with those who had been accused.

The question which now arises is, What shall be thought of those professing to be bewitched, and especially of the afflicted children?

Were they practising pure imposture all the while, or were they under the power of some hallucination? We cannot make ourselves believe in the first supposition. It would argue a degree of cold-blooded wickedness and depravity almost impossible to conceive, especially in persons so young.

Still there are undoubted evidences of studied fraud and craft in their conduct. It was testified against them more than once that, according to their own confession, they sometimes cried out against persons for sport; and some were detected in pricking themselves with pins, and then charging it upon persons accused, showing the marks.

But we think it was not all deception. The fits and convulsions were not all sham. We are of the opinion that more or less of what they did was done under a hallucination. It will be remembered that they began with meeting at Mr. Parris's for the practice of palmistry, fortune-telling, magic and sooth-saying. This circle had been carrying on their operations two months before they attracted attention. We are disposed to think that in that time, from dealing with ideas and performances of a semi-supernatural character, they got into an excitable, morbid, hysterical condition, in which such manifestations are common, and may be had at will. Practice gave them facility, and at length the things they did were really something remarkable. They did not pretend, in the outset, that their

strange and painful experiences arose from their being bewitched.

This was the opinion, first, of the village physician, and then of the ministers. As soon as this belief was expressed, then the question was, "Who are the witches?" And the children were urged to declare their names. In the morbidly nervous state they were in, it is not strange that they should have fallen in with the opinion given by others, and imagined it to be a fact, and cast about for names and persons suitable to be charged. Persons in such a state of mind imagine all sorts of things, which, to a sober man, seem absurd, but to them solemn verities. Had the doctor and ministers not said that they were bewitched, and urged them to tell who did it, in our opinion, what is known as the witchcraft delusion would never have occurred. But how—though the idea was thus introduced and acted upon by the children—how, it will be asked, was the delusion kept up so long, and able to deceive judges, ministers and people? It was mainly through the consummate acting of the children. Mr. Upham speaks of it as follows:—

"Long practice had given them complete control over their countenances, intonations of voice, and the entire muscular and nervous organization of their bodies, so that they could at will, and on the instant, go into fits and convulsions, swoon and fall upon the floor, put their frames into strange contortions, bring the blood to the face and send it back again. They would be deadly pale at one moment, at the next flushed; their hands would be clenched and held together as with a vise; their limbs stiff and rigid, or wholly relaxed; their teeth would be set; they would go through the paroxysms of choking and strangulation, and gasp for breath, bringing froth and blood from the mouth; they would utter all sorts of screams in unearthly tones; their eyes remain fixed, sometimes cold and stony, and sometimes kindled into flames of passion; they would pass into the state of somnambulism, without aim or conscious direction in their movements, looking at some point where was no apparent object of vision, with a wild unmeaning glare. There are some indications that they had acquired the art of ventriloquism; or they so wrought upon the imaginations of the beholders that the sounds of the motions and voices of invisible beings were believed to be heard. They would start, tremble and be palled before apparitions, seen, of course, only by themselves; but their acting was so perfect that all present thought they saw them too. They would address and hold colloquy with spectres and ghosts; and the responses of the unseen beings would be audible to the fancy of the

bewildered crowd. They would follow with their eyes the airy visions, so that others imagined they also beheld them."—*Vol. II., p. 395.*

It will doubtless occur to many, while reading the account we have given of the beginning of the witchcraft delusion in Salem Village, and especially of the meeting of those girls in the fall before the spring of 1692, at different houses, for the practice of magic, and similar arts, by which they got themselves in training for the part they were to perform in the shocking tragedy which followed, that there is some similarity between their performances and those of modern spiritualists. Indeed, one can scarcely avoid the conviction that what was then regarded as witchcraft, and what is now called spiritualism, form one and the same thing. This is Mr. Upham's opinion. He says:—

"The principal difference in the methods by which communications were believed to be made between mortals and spiritual beings at the time of the witchcraft delusion and now, is this. Then it was chiefly by the medium of the eye, but at present by the ear. The afflicted children professed to have seen and conversed with the ghosts of George Burroughs' wives, and others. Now it is affirmed by those calling themselves spiritualists, that by certain rappings, and other incantations, they can summon into immediate but invisible presence the spirits of the departed, hold conference with them, and draw from them information not derivable from any sources of human knowledge. There is no essential distinction between the old and the new belief and practice. The consequences that resulted from the former would be likely to result from the latter, if it should obtain universal or general credence, be allowed to mix with judicial proceedings, or to any extent affect the rights of person, property or character."—*Page 228, Vol. II.\**

The pernicious results of tampering with such matters, and the inexpediency of attempting to do it, are thus well stated by Mr. Upham:—

"It may be that the air is full of spiritual beings hovering about us, but all

\* We need not take the trouble of proving the identity of witchcraft with spiritualism, for spiritualists themselves admit it.

In the "*Banner of Light*," their organ in this country, in the number issued Feb. 22, 1868, we find the following, on page 6, under the message department. The name of the medium is not given.

Q. "What is the difference, if any, between modern spiritism and necromancy, sorcery, divination, and witchcraft? Many spiritualists maintain that there is none."

A. "And so do I, absolutely no difference."

experience shows that no benefit can be derived from seeking their intervention, to share with us the duties or the burdens of our present probation. The mischiefs which have flowed from the belief that they can operate upon human affairs, and from attempting to have dealings with them, have been illustrated in the course of our narrative. Enlightened reflection, common sense, natural prudence, would seem to be sufficient to keep men from meddling with practices or countenancing notions from which all history proclaims that no good has ever come, but incalculable evil flowed."

Speaking of the wonderful stories told concerning what are termed spiritual manifestations, he says:—

"All I am prompted ever to remark is, that if spirits do come, as is believed, at the call of those who seek to put themselves in communication with them, there is no evidence that they are good spirits. I have never heard of their doing much good substantially to any one. No important truth has been revealed by them, no discovery been made, no science had its field enlarged, no department of knowledge has been brought into a clearer light, no great interest has been promoted, no impulse has been given to society, and no elevation to life and character."

With a history so barren of positive good, and abounding in such dreadful evils, charged with originating the mischiefs of the witchcraft delusion in Salem, and known to have filled the madhouses of the land with lunatics, we cannot see what spiritualism has to recommend itself to a thoughtful, prudent man. If we are to know a thing by its fruits, and treat it accordingly, no one could or should look upon it with the least indulgence or friendliness.

It is humiliating to reflect how generally the clergy shared in the delusion. Parris, of Salem Village, Noyes, of First Church of Salem Town, Hale, of Beverly, and Cotton Mather, of Boston, entered with a strange and ill-fitting zeal into the persecutions which arose. Whenever they perceived any slacking of the public wrath against it, they would excite it anew, and hound it on. The popular feeling received its strongest impulse, and their absurd opinions upon the subject a full confirmation, from a sermon preached by Lawson at Salem Village in the beginning of the excitement. It seemed to set the authority and the testimony of Scripture on the side of the existing statutes con-

cerning witchcraft, and justified the cruel measures used to suppress it.

Parris, in particular, seems to have taken what was really a criminal part in the transactions. The circle of children began their operations at his house ; there they were in training for the part they afterwards enacted ; there they brought themselves into that hysteric state in which they were able at will to go into those fits and convulsions which so amazed and deceived the people. And during the trials and examinations, they were accustomed to meet there to arrange, as it seems, their plan of operations. It is manifest throughout the narrative that there was some guiding intelligence behind the children directing their actions. There was, Mr. Upham thinks, too nice an adjustment of circumstances and particulars, too exact and orderly a sequence of events, to be spontaneous. It must have been contrived, and Parris was, we cannot help thinking, the one who did it. The victims selected were such as were objects of vengeance and fear with him. When the delusion ended, he was charged by certain members of his church who had suffered from it, with approving and practising "unwarrantable and ungrounded methods for discovering what he was desirous to know referring to the bewitched, as in bringing some to others and by and from them pretending to inform himself and others who were the Devil's instruments to afflict the sick and pained." He was also charged with having given "an unsafe and unaccountable oath against sundry of the accused, and of not rendering so fair, if true, an account of what he wrote on examination of the afflicted."

These charges were confirmed by the council called to decide upon the grievances alleged against him, and led to his dismissal.

But the ministers were not more deluded than the judges of the courts. The latter were completely under the influence of the infatuation, accepted with undoubting faith the spectral evidence of the afflicted children, and gave their verdicts accordingly.

In reading Mr. Upham's narrative, one feels that the horrors of the witchcraft delusion were due, more to the infatuation of Chief Justice Stoughton, and the assistants who sat on the bench with him, than to the persecuting zeal of Cotton Mather, Samuel Parris and Nicholas Noyes. Those judges of court were so entirely under the power of the delusion that they ignored every principle of justice and fairness in the conduct of the trials over which they presided. Instead of protecting the accused in their rights, insisting that they should have a fair trial, and, according to the humane spirit and maxims of English law, regarding them as innocent until actually proved guilty, they assumed their guilt at the very outset, badgered them with sharp cross-questioning, and overwhelmed them with violence of manner, to silence every attempt at defence, and to extort from them confessions of guilt. Their conduct towards the poor victims of a false accusation was almost as cruel and outrageous as that of the infamous Jeffreys. We have already alluded to the passion the magistrates fell into at the examination of Giles Corey,—how, imputing the sufferings of the afflicted children in court to his agency, they wrathfully exclaimed, "What, is it not enough to act witchcraft at other times, but must you do it now in the face of authority?" The accused denying that he had any agency in causing the sufferings of the girls, the judges sternly answered, "Why do you tell such wicked lies?" A similar prejudice and want of impartiality was displayed by them at all the trials.

One cannot help thinking that if they had borne themselves as sternly towards the accusers, and subjected their testimony to a similar severe scrutiny, it would have accorded far better with their office, and been more to the purpose. They might thus have detected the imposture, and prevented the horrors which resulted from it. At any rate, the questions they put with such indignant sternness to the poor, confounded prisoners, might have been far more justly addressed to the accusers. They are precisely the questions that occur to us, as we now review those cases, sitting in the judgment-seat of history, with

the evidence before us. More than once, in reading the narrative, while filled with wrath at the effrontery and wickedness, as we were forced to consider it, of the informing witnesses, we have repeated the same words, or what was equivalent to them,—"What, is it not enough to act witchcraft at other times, but must you do it now in the face of authority?" and "Why do you tell such wicked lies?" Would that honest John Procter, one of their noblest victims, whom they denounced from pure malice, had sat on the bench! He had the sagacity to penetrate the fraud, and said "they should rather be had to the whipping-post" than listened to. A little of that treatment would have cured the afflicted children, and prevented the Salem tragedies.

A remarkable instance of the complete subjection of the judges to the power of the delusion was afforded in the trial of Rebecca Nurse, already referred to. The jury brought in a verdict of not guilty, and were sent back by the judges to reconsider the case, and bring in a more satisfactory verdict—a thing almost unparalleled in the history of our courts.

But there is a satisfaction in knowing that the most of them lived to see and bitterly repent of their error. Judge Samuel Sewall made a public confession of it in church, and observed ever afterwards one day each year, as long as he lived, as a day of fasting and penitent prayer on account of it.

We have thought it fit to speak thus of the conduct of the judges of court in that day, and their participation in the delusion, as well as the clergy, because, hitherto, the clergy have had to bear more than their share of the reproach arising from its disastrous results. As Mr. Upham says, "the intimate connection of Dr. Cotton Mather, and other prominent ministers, with the witchcraft delusion, brought a reproach upon the clergy from which they have not recovered."

We insist that the ministry were no more responsible than other professions for what occurred at that time. If the physician of Salem Village had not gravely pronounced the convulsions and apparent sufferings of the afflicted children to be the work of witchcraft, it is quite probable there would have been



no accusations and arrests for that alleged crime. And if, after the accused had been brought into court, the judges had not been equally infatuated with the common error, the prisoners would have been discharged, as having done nothing worthy of trial or punishment. But the events occurred as they did occur on account of the universal belief which men had in the doctrines of witchcraft, and the opinions then everywhere held concerning the proper mode of dealing with it. As Longfellow says of these transactions at Salem,—

“This sudden burst of wickedness and crime  
Was but the common madness of the time,  
When, in all lands that lie within the sound  
Of Sabbath bells, a witch was burned or drowned.”

It was, therefore, not to the particular discredit of the ministry that they more or less shared in the universal belief, unless it can be justly shown that they should keep free from the errors and mistakes which other men fall into.\*

\* Justice requires that it should be furthermore added that there were many among the clergy who disapproved of the extreme measures employed against the accused, and who dissented from the prevailing opinions concerning witchcraft. They did not believe that such authority should be allowed to spectral evidence as was given to it in the courts. They suspected the honesty and sincerity of the witnesses, and alleged that though it might be possible for the Devil to assume a human shape, and in that shape to torment men, yet there was no reason for supposing that the shape assumed was that of a person in guilty league with him. It might be that of some pious, godly person. He, who is represented in the Scriptures as being sometimes transformed into an angel of light, might, for aught that was known to the contrary, also appear in the form of a saint.

Among those who took ground more or less open and decided against the violent proceedings employed against those charged with witchcraft, were Rev. John Higginson, of Salem, Rev. Samuel Willard, Rev. John Bailey and Rev. James Allen, of Boston, Rev. Increase Mather, President of Harvard College, Rev. John Wise, of Ipswich, Rev. Nathaniel Dane, of Andover, and Rev. Samuel Cheever, of Marblehead. These men stood at the head of their profession.

If, therefore, having in remembrance the meeting of the neighboring clergymen at Mr. Parris's house in the beginning of the witchcraft movement, and their unanimous opinion that the sufferings of the afflicted children which they witnessed were caused by the Devil and his agents, it be said that they led the way into the delusion, it may also be said that they were first to recover from it and lead the people out of it. They signed petitions for the pardon and acquittal of those accused, and lamented, as long as they lived, the blindness by which they had been made to give credence to so horrible and absurd a superstition. So Mr. Upham says: “Justice requires it to be said that the ministers, as a general thing, *did not* take the lead, after the proceedings had assumed their most violent aspect, and the disastrous effects had been fully brought to view. It may be said, on the contrary, that they took the lead, as a class, in checking the delusion, and rescuing the public mind from its control.” See Vol. II., pp. 363, 364.

There is one reflection which comforts us as we lay down these volumes. It is this: that the poor victims of that terrible affair, who died in shame and disgrace, though innocent, have at length had their characters nobly vindicated, and received a sort of compensation, in the present and perpetual admiration with which their Christian patience and fortitude will be regarded. Had they not suffered as they did, had they been allowed to descend to their graves in peace, their names would have been forgotten.

Through their unjust sufferings they have obtained a lasting remembrance.

This thought, in connection with their refusal to purchase exemption through falsehood, gives a striking confirmation to certain words of Dr. Channing:—

“There is,” he says, “one consolation attending persecution. It often exalts the spirit of the sufferer, and often covers with honor those whom it had destined to shame. Who made Socrates the most venerable name of antiquity? The men who mixed for him the cup of hemlock, and drove him as a criminal from the world which he had enlightened. Providence teaches us the doctrine of retribution very touchingly in the fact, that future ages guard with peculiar reverence the memories of men, who in their own times were innocently contemned, abhorred, hunted like wild beasts, and destroyed for their fidelity to truth.”

We cannot refrain, while upon this subject of witchcraft, from alluding to the views of Lecky and other rationalistic writers upon the subject. They attribute the belief in witchcraft to the doctrines of future retribution and diabolic influence in human affairs, as these have been held and are held to-day by the great majority of the Christian world. Mr. Lecky says, “It may be stated as an invariable truth, that whenever a religion, which rests, in a great measure, on a system of terrorism, and which paints in dark and forcible colors the misery of men and the power of evil spirits, is intensely realized, it will engender the belief in witchcraft.” (*Hist. of Rationalism*, Vol. I., p. 37.) Speaking of the prevalence of this belief in Scotland two or three hundred years ago, and the cruelties growing out of it, he says:—

"Scotch witchcraft was the result of Scotch Puritanism. The delusion invariably accompanied the religious terrorism which the Scotch clergy so zealously maintained. One word from them might have arrested the tortures, but that word was never spoken. Yet they were men who displayed at times the highest and the most heroic virtues. They had not flinched from religious persecution, they had never paltered with their consciences to attain kingly favor. Their self-devotion and zeal in their sacred calling had seldom been surpassed. They were but illustrations of the great truth, that when men have come to regard a certain class of their fellow-creatures as doomed by the Almighty to eternal and excruciating agonies, and when accustomed to the contemplation of such agonies by theological belief, the result will be indifference to the sufferings of those regarded as the enemies of God, as absolute as it is possible for human nature to attain."

Two sentences more will suffice to convey Mr. Lecky's opinion of the cause and conditions of belief in witchcraft:—

"In order that men should believe in witches, their intellects must have been familiarized with the conceptions of Satanic power and Satanic presence, and they must regard these things with an unfaltering belief. In order that witchcraft should be prominent, the imaginations of men must have been so forcibly directed to these articles of belief as to tinge and govern the habitual current of their thoughts, and to produce a strong disposition to see Satanic agency around them."—*Hist. of Rat.*, Vol. I., p. 81.

The inference is, all through his discussion of the subject, that faith in the New Testament teachings concerning things supernatural, and more especially concerning Satan and the powers of evil, is to blame for the delusions of witchcraft and all the mischiefs that have arisen from it. If men had regarded the language of Saint Paul as unmeaning, or purely figurative, when he speaks of "The Prince of the power of the air, the Spirit that *now worketh* in the children of disobedience;" if they had considered him as indulging in a flight of fancy, or merely falling in with certain prevalent superstitions of his day, when he thus exhorts the Ephesians: "Put on the whole armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the Devil, for we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against wicked spirits in high places;" if they had scouted at the idea of there really existing any such beings as "the Devil and his angels;" if they had treated these

notions in a rationalistic spirit, then one dark page in human history, that relating to witchcraft, never could have been written. Mr. Lecky is of the opinion that belief in witchcraft has disappeared from Christendom through the rise and progress of the rationalistic spirit. It has not been argued down, but has "passed away by a silent and unreasoning process under the influence of civilization." The skeptical writers and schools of Germany, Hume, Voltaire and Montaigne, and the influences generated from them,—these have done the work.

By attacking the supernatural element in the Christian religion, denying the possibility of miracles, and confining belief within the limits of natural law and material fact, they have modified the character of the public mind. A new tone and habit of thought have been formed, the measure of probability has been altered, and thus those old opinions have been gradually laid aside. This, we believe, is a fair statement of Mr. Lecky's views upon the topic in discussion.

With a due respect for the extensive learning exhibited in his writings, we venture to say that he has not established his positions. In the name of Christian truth, we deny the charges made against her. She is not responsible for the monstrous doctrines of witchcraft; and however much her professed adherents may have been engaged in exciting persecution against it, she is not accountable for that either.

Belief in witchcraft, and the various grotesque notions connected with it, are of heathen origin. They obtain no warrant from the Bible. According to Mr. Lecky's own account, we find the belief in witchcraft universal in the ruder forms of savage life, and accompanied, in most instances, by features of peculiar atrocity. (See *Hist. of Rationalism*, Vol. I., p. 40.) The belief that it is possible by supernatural agency to inflict evil on mankind was general in ancient Greece and Rome. (See p. 42, Vol. I.) The Decemvirs passed a law condemning magicians, or wizards, to death. A similar law was enacted in Greece; and in the days of Demosthenes, a sorceress, or witch, named Lemia, was executed.

The peculiar doctrines of witchcraft have existed in the East from a remote antiquity. Tacitus speaks of magicians and soothsayers as flocking to Rome in large numbers from that quarter of the world. The spirits with which they pretended to hold intercourse were not supposed to be specifically bad or malignant, but somehow, through powerful spell or incantation, subject to their direction and control. Pliny speaks of magic as a most fraudulent art that has had sway in all the world. The Romans generally believed in the power of certain persons to afflict with an evil eye, and had their amulets to protect them from it. Appollonius of Tyana, whose life certain infidel writers venture to set up as an offset to that of Christ, affirming that the pretended miracles he wrought were like those of Jesus, and as much entitled him to receive divine honors—this man was but a renowned magician, a practiser of witchcraft, pretending to have commerce with spirits, and to work wonders by their aid.

The belief has existed among the Arabs from the earliest times. We find good illustrations of it in the "Arabian Nights," in the stories of genii and their marvellous performances under human direction.

The ideas of supernatural agency contained in those wonderful tales were not the invention of a day—they had been held in solution, so to speak, in the popular mind for ages, and were simply crystallized into fixed and definite forms in that collection of stories. The spirits, whose performances are related in them, are not represented as possessing a uniformly malignant nature. They seem to have no marked moral characteristics either way. They are simply obedient to authority—owning the power of the spell which invokes them—generally, however, working for the good rather than the injury of men. These beliefs and magical practices, which went under the different names of divination, witchcraft, necromancy and sorcery, existed among the nations of Palestine, which were expelled by the Israelites. They formed a part of their idolatrous religion. The people of God were forbidden to practice those things, and commanded to put

to death any who pretended to do it, just as they were forbidden to worship the false gods of the land, and to put to death the priests of such false worship. There is no assent given to the reality or truthfulness of those magical rites. On the contrary, the implication is that they were condemned as impostures. They were as false as the idolatrous worship with which they were associated. Witches and sorcerers were to be put to death as pretenders, who deceived and misled the people. A few verses from the charge which Moses gave to Israel indicate this : "When thou art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, thou shalt not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a necromancer. For all that do these things are an abomination unto the Lord. For these nations which thou shalt possess hearkened unto observers of times and unto diviners," &c. (See Deut., 18th chap., 9th verse, *et seq.*) In classing witchcraft thus with other idolatrous practices of the nations who inhabited Palestine, did not Moses, or God himself, who spoke to the chosen people through him, indicate that it was equally false with all the rest? The account that is given of the interview of Saul with the witch of Endor, and the raising of the spirit of Samuel on that occasion, instead of disproving this view rather confirms it. The bringing up of Samuel was obviously no common affair. The woman, when she saw him, "cried with a loud voice," evidently from astonishment at the result of her incantations. She was alarmed because, for once, by divine permission and power, her farce was made a fact, and she saw the solemn shades of the dead ascending out of the earth. If it had been an ordinary thing for her to bring up the dead, she would not have evinced such startled fear.

There were doubtless other reasons besides those, of its being an imposture, and associated with idolatrous practices, why witchcraft was prohibited among the Israelites. It was a pro-

fane intermeddling, or attempt to intermeddle, with things out of the reach of human knowledge and human affairs. It would tend to weaken their sense of dependence upon God, and harden their hearts from his fear. The case of Saul is a case in point. He had displeased God by his disobedience, so that the Lord had departed from him.

When, in his fear of the Philistines, he inquired of the Lord, the Lord answered him not, by any of the usual modes of divine communications, "neither by dreams nor by Urim nor by prophets." But Saul would know the future in spite, as it were, of the determined silence of Jehovah. So he resorted to the woman reputed to have a familiar spirit, thinking, by illicit means, to accomplish his desire. Thus witchcraft encouraged him into the sin of rebellion—made him try to lift a veil which God would not have lifted.

There is no intimation that witches were to be destroyed, because, in the practice of the black art, they tortured or tempted men by infernal agency. No hint is given of their being in league with Satan. Indeed, according to Mr. Lecky's acknowledgment, the conception of a witch, as we now have it,—i. e., of a woman who had entered into a deliberate compact with Satan, and was therefore endowed with the power of working miracles whenever she pleased, this conception did not appear until the twelfth century. So of those doctrines of witchcraft which have been detailed in an earlier part of this article.

What does this fact prove? That no grounds exist in the Bible for belief in witchcraft as a reality—that is, witchcraft as it ultimately came to be understood, and as it was regarded in the persecutions waged throughout Christendom against those accused of it two or three hundred years ago. We think enough has been said to show that such is the case as regards that part of the Bible included in the Old Testament. Turning over to the New Testament, and examining the contents of that, we can find no real warrant for such notions there. At the very entrance of the New Testament, we find the account



of Christ's temptation. It was supposed, in witchcraft times, that this narrative afforded an example of Satanic agency, and especially of one mode of it. For instance, it was supposed that the idea that witches had the power, in virtue of their compact with the Devil, of riding aloft in the air, was authorized by the statement that the Devil took Christ up into the holy city, and set him on a pinnacle of the temple, and that he also took him up into an exceeding high mountain. The supposition of Jerome was adopted, that Jesus was carried through the air. But, as Lange says, such a supposition is purely fantastic. Even if we take the view that the temptation was an objective, external occurrence, such a supposition is not warranted by anything in the narrative. And even if it should be adopted as an easy explanation of the facts, it would not apply to the case of witches. In order that it might have such an application, we must suppose that Christ had made a sinful compact with Satan. But it is by no means certain that the temptation was an objective, external occurrence. Some of the ablest commentators are of the opinion that it was a supernatural, internal occurrence, or an inward, ethical transaction. (See Lange on Matt., p. 82, *et seq.*) If this view be received, all inferences derived from the narrative in support of witchcraft notions go for nothing.

The next thing which may be alleged as affording ground for the doctrines of witchcraft, is the fact of the recognition of demoniacal possessions, so many instances of which are recorded in the Gospels. The sufferings which some of those afflicted from this cause are represented to have experienced, and from which they were miraculously delivered by Christ and his apostles, may have been thought identical with those which the afflicted children and others supposed to be victims of witchcraft suffered. No doubt, as they are represented as effects of Satanic agency, they were regarded as similar, at least, to the latter, and as affording a ground of inference that Satan did sometimes afflict human beings with physical sufferings and convulsions. But there is no intimation in any of those accounts

of possession by evil spirits, that witches had anything to do with the sufferings inflicted.

We are told of a cure which Christ performed upon the daughter of a certain Syrophenician woman. In her statement of the case, the mother said, "My daughter is grievously vexed with a devil." In order to be able to derive any warrant from this case or any other, for the belief in witchcraft, it should be made to appear that it was not a devil at all which vexed the girl, but the apparition of some old woman, who was in league with Satan, and was enabled thus invisibly to torture and vex her. For, as already stated, it was one of the principal doctrines of witchcraft that the Devil could not injure people except through the agency of other human beings in league with him. But nowhere in the Gospels is a witch mentioned, or a hint given that witchcraft had anything to do in producing the maladies which Christ and his apostles cured.

The word witchcraft occurs only once in our English version of the New Testament. (See Gal. 5: 20.) It is then enumerated in connection with idolatry, as among the works of the flesh, which connection confirms what we have before said of its being an idolatrous practice, found associated with false religions as part and parcel of them. The original word is "*φαρμακεία*," and may as well be rendered *sorcery*. It is rendered so in each of the other only two places where it is used in the New Testament. One of these places is the last clause of the twenty-third verse of the eighteenth chapter of Revelation; viz., "by thy sorceries were all nations deceived," which alleges one of the crimes of Babylon the Great, on account of which she is doomed to destruction. This clause teaches us, whether we translate the word sorcery or witchcraft, that the thing signified by it was an imposture, because it deceived men!

We think we have thus established that nothing like witchcraft, as we understand it, is taught or recognized as a veritable reality in the Bible. That absurd collection of superstitious ideas was essentially heathenish in its origin and character. Neither can the Christian doctrine of the future punishment of

the wicked be charged with fostering such notions. We venture to say that this doctrine, and others relating to things supernatural, were as vividly realized and as firmly believed in the early ages of Christianity as ever they were. How did it happen, then, that witchcraft, in the form which it finally took, and under which it was the occasion of so many horrors, did not arise in Christendom, as a definite belief, until the twelfth century? If it is the certain tendency of those doctrines to engender belief in witchcraft, would it have required so long a time for the superstition to come to birth? Would it not have been likely to manifest itself at a much earlier date? If there were anything in the assumptions of Mr. Lecky, we do not doubt it would have happened so. But it did not; and when Christianity was purest, and its doctrines most fully embodied in the practice of the church, there was the least trace of such a thing. Not until Christianity was corrupted, and the dark ages came on; not until the Bible became a sealed book, and its teachings were imperfectly understood; not until Papacy had cast its fell shadow over the world, and blighted everything like freedom of thought and independent inquiry of the oracles of God; not until monkish superstition and ignorance and bigotry had come to be the only qualifications of those who guided the church and instructed it in the knowledge of Christian truth—not until then did the belief appear to work out its horrible mischief.

When Christianity was brought by corruption down to the level of heathenism, then that, which everywhere accompanies, and is a part of heathenism, appeared. If it was worse and more horrible than it had ever shown itself in any pagan land, it was upon a principle similar to that by which a fallen angel is worse than a fallen man. Christianity is not responsible for the delusions of witchcraft, neither did she, through any of her doctrines, bring it on. They are responsible who hid her light, who chained the word of God to the walls of monasteries, and forbid the people to read it. We say this, notwithstanding the fact that the last great instance of the prevalence of the delusion

occurred in Puritan New England, where all men read the Bible, and might be supposed to have known what its teachings were. The fact is, that the error had been so universal and so deeply impressed upon human belief, during that long dark period in the history of Christianity, that it could not be soon effaced.

It lingered long after the light of the Reformation broke forth, as the remembrance and shuddering fear of a horrible nightmare may linger far on into the day.

We as much disagree with Mr. Lecky in our opinion of the cause or causes which have led to the disappearance of the belief in witchcraft from the minds of men, as in our opinion of the causes which brought it on. He thinks that it is because the sense of the supernatural has died out from the minds of men, and belief in the doctrine of retribution and the existence of evil spirits has decayed; in other words, because of the growth of a rationalistic spirit, that faith in witchcraft has gone from Christendom. He assumes that those old doctrines of the Christian church have either entirely perished, or else possess so little vitality, that they are now as good as dead, and wholly inoperative. Another cause alleged is distrust of everything miraculous—the growing belief that a miracle is impossible—that nothing can happen which is out of the course of nature, or not within the power of known natural causes. He considers this skeptical, rationalizing tendency so characteristic of modern times that it gives tone to the age—nay, that it is itself the spirit of the age. We do not recognize any such remarkable tendency, neither do we own that there has been any decay of faith in supernatural things.

Mr. Upham alludes to this assumption found in rationalistic writings, and denies its truth:—

“Essays have been written,” he says, “and books published, to prove that the sense of the miraculous is destined to decline as mankind becomes more enlightened, and ascribing a greater or less tendency to the indulgence of this sense to particular periods of the church, or systems of belief, or schools of what is called philosophy. It is maintained that it was more prevalent in the mediæval ages than in modern times. Some assert that it has had a greater development in Catholic than Protestant countries; and some perhaps insist

upon the reverse. Some attempt to show that it has manifested itself more remarkably among Puritans than in other classes of Protestant Christians.

The last and most pretentious form of this dogma is, that the sense of the miraculous fades away in the progress of what arrogates to itself the name of Rationalism.

This is one of the delusive results of introducing generalization into historical disquisitions. History deals with man. Man is always the same. \* \* \* The particular forms and shapes in which the sense of the miraculous may express itself have passed and will pass away in the progress of civilization. But the sense itself remains; just as particular costumes and fashions of garment pass away, while the human form, its front erect and its vision towards the heavens, remains. The sense of the miraculous remains with Protestants as much as with Catholics, with Churchmen as much as with Puritans, with those who reject all creeds equally with those whose creeds are the longest and the oldest.

In our day it must have been generally noticed that the wonders of what imagines itself to be Spiritualism are rather more accredited by persons who aspire to the character of rationalists than by those who hold on tenaciously to the old landmarks of orthodoxy."—*Vol. II., p. 431.*

The other assumptions are equally groundless. The doctrine of future retribution has not been expunged from the Christian religion, nor become inoperative, and it never can be, since it is the spontaneous conviction of the soul.

We attribute the fading away of witchcraft to a far different cause than the partial rejection of the truths of the Bible. We think it is due to the fact that the Bible has come to be better understood, and the spirit of its teachings more truly apprehended. It has all come to pass in fulfilment of the prediction which John Robinson made to our Puritan forefathers, before their departure from Holland, that more light was to break forth from God's word than they had yet received. That light was to have the effect of clearing away the darkness of error, as well as to reveal new truth. Great as had been the increase of light during the one or two centuries preceding the time when he spoke, the bright and cloudless day of truth had not yet fully come. False beliefs remained behind like lingering shadows of the night. Witchcraft was one of these, which was not to depart until, like a morning tempest, it had convulsed the atmosphere, and caused a wide-spread dismay in that distant colony to which the company he addressed was going.

The art of printing was then but in its infancy. Books were few and expensive. Not long had the human mind been released from the bondage of ages. The science of Biblical interpretation had not made much progress. The gentle, humane spirit of revived Christianity had not permeated society, and tinctured its thoughts and feelings so deeply and strongly as it has since. It is to the operation of these causes that we ascribe the decline of belief in witchcraft. Not to any weakening of the sense of the miraculous, not to any rising skepticism concerning certain doctrines of the Bible, not to the closing of the eyes to some of its obnoxious rays, but to the fact of its being more clearly and fully seen what the doctrines of the Bible are, do we owe the change.

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## ARTICLE II.

### MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE CIVIL COURTS.

§ 1. *The New Testament law of Marriage and Divorce.*—Marriage is the union of one man and woman for life. It can be of but one on either part. Twain only can make one flesh in a state of wedlock. A second man taken while the first is living is but a paramour, a second woman but a concubine.

Our Lord teaches that only one cause can break this bond of wedlock—adultery. If broken for this cause, the innocent party only may marry again. Even this cause of divorce is not allowed as originally and intrinsically worthy, or absolutely right, but only expedient, and suffered “because of the hardness of men’s hearts.” (Matt. 19.)

In the seventh chapter of his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, St. Paul discusses a separation of husband and wife in certain circumstances. The unbelieving partner must be

allowed to depart, if this be wished, but may not be forced to depart; and the believing or Christian companion may not cast off the unbelieving, or withdraw from the bonds and obligations of matrimony. But if a separation take place because of any apparently unendurable severities in the united life, the parties must remain unmarried till one of them die. Only adultery, according to New Testament law, allows the injured party to marry again. With very general, though not perfect unanimity, interpreters of St. Paul thus explain his teachings as in full accord with those of Christ.

§ 2. *The Papal doctrine of Marriage and Divorce.*—The Romish theory makes the marriage bond as lasting as the life of the parties. No desertion, defects, cruelty, crime or immorality can abrogate it, not even adultery.

The seventh canon on matrimony enacted by the Council of Trent reads thus: "If any one shall say that the church doth err in that she hath taught and doth teach, according to the evangelical and apostolic doctrine, that the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the married parties, and that both, or even the innocent party, who gave not occasion to the adultery, cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other married person, and that he is guilty of adultery, who, having put away the adulteress, shall marry another wife, as also she, who, having put away the adulterer, shall wed another husband: let him be anathema."

In the eighth canon, the Papal church declares that "for many causes a separation may take place between husband and wife, in regard of bed or cohabitation, for a determinate, or for an indeterminate period." This is the divorce from bed and board which St. Paul allowed when he said: "If the unbelieving depart, let him depart." This in no wise sunders the marriage bond, or leaves either party free to marry again. Many such separations for adultery are granted by special indulgence of the Romish church where the law of Christ should hold.



§ 3. *The doctrine of Marriage and Divorce in the Protestant countries of Europe.*—Luther, in a sermon of 1525, denies the right of divorce “except on account of whoredom and adultery.” Yet, in a written opinion given the same year, he says: “Whoever will not stay, let him be off. The other party is not bound to stay unmarried,” &c. The Lutheran church made adultery and desertion good grounds for divorce. Zwingli added to these, plotting against the life of one’s consort, and says the judge may consider cruelty, madness and leprosy as possible grounds for divorce. Calvin is not clear on the question. Beza thinks the deserted party may marry again.

And so the Protestant commentators generally of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Grotius says: “She is not bound to remain unmarried, and to wait for or to seek for reconciliation.” The civil courts held to the two grounds for divorce. Late in the seventeenth century, irreconcilable animosity, incompatibility of temper, cruelty and contagious diseases began to become grounds for divorce. Then followed drunkenness, loose habits, insanity and unfruitfulness in wedlock.

In England, under the Papacy, only separation from bed and board was allowed, but the Reformation brought in the Protestant view of divorce for adultery, and re-marriage by special act of Parliament. By the present laws of England, separation may be had for desertion and cruelty, and divorce for the husband for adultery, and for the wife for adultery with aggravating accompaniments.

§ 4. *The theory and practice of Marriage and Divorce in the United States.*—Our Puritan fathers granted, at first, divorce for adultery and desertion. But soon marking other causes as good as desertion, they glided off into a variety. Maryland kept her statutes after the pattern of her Catholic founders, and Virginia preserved the old English model. At first, the legislatures had control of this question, but gradually it went to

particular courts. Till the Revolution, marriage bonds showed a strong religious element ; but after that period, they degenerated more and more into the spirit and letter of mere civil contracts. So as marriage was contracted for civil and social purposes and ends, it came easily into public opinion and legislation to abrogate the contract when these ends failed. The different States grant divorce for different reasons, and they also vary as to the privilege of re-marrying. Their laws of marriage and divorce are without uniformity, and do not always respect the decisions of each other, when a divorce or a re-marriage has been granted. Taking States as a whole, divorce may now be obtained in them for adultery, desertion, imprisonment for crime, joining a religious society that regards marriage as unlawful, neglect to support the wife, drunkenness, cruelty, inability to live in peace and harmony together—in all, eight causes. Some of these are so indefinite that it cannot be difficult to break the irksome bond, where both parties, or even one, determine on it.

As to the penal consequences of adultery, they vary greatly in the different States. Some, as New York, following the English law, do not make it criminal. Others impose a fine of ten dollars, and on to one thousand dollars, as each State may estimate the guilt. Yet other States visit with imprisonment, varying among them from sixty days to five years ; while a few codes combine fine and imprisonment. This penal view of adultery contrasts boldly with Colonial statutes, when Massachusetts made it a capital offence, or softened the punishment to sitting on the gallows a given time, a whipping of forty stripes toward the jail, and wearing the adulterer's A, two inches long, on the outside garment, and when Connecticut gave the halter without hanging, the whipping, and burnt the A into the forehead. Rhode Island, Vermont, Pennsylvania and Virginia used similar severity in early times, or prior to 1700. Now the crime is rarely visited by the hands of the law, and private vengeance uses the bludgeon, the dagger, and even the pistol and

shot-gun, on the public street, and the populace cheer the man of blood when the jury return verdict for acquittal.\*

At this stage of our inquiry, it will be noticed how far the Christian States, home and foreign, have drifted from the simple law of Christ, as to the just cause for divorce. It will be noticed, too, that in lowering the nature of the marriage bond from a moral and religious vow to a civil contract, its sacredness has been slowly fading out, and the desire to sunder it has much increased. So legislators, not asking so much what is right as what is wanted, are making it more and more easy to gain divorce. Like business partnerships, the law provides for the easy forming and dissolving of marriage ties, and old partners go into new firms without a hindrance from antecedent moral bankruptcy.

Of course, divorce is fearfully increasing. While, formerly, cases of it were rare, it has become common beyond surprise, and almost beyond remark. In Massachusetts, the ratio of divorces, annual, to the marriages, is one in forty-four; in Ohio, one in twenty-six; in Vermont, one in twenty-one; and in Connecticut, "the land of steady habits," one in eleven. The number in Indiana is estimated at two thousand per annum. This is an alarming and fearful state of things on so vital a moral and social question. For we cannot consider too profoundly the fact that the foundation of the State and of the church, too, is the family, and that the family basis is the sanctity and perpetuity of the marriage bond.

To these statistics of divorce, it should be added, that the Protestant faith, at home and abroad, furnishes a much greater ratio of divorces than the Papal. The reasons are obvious. Their theory refuses the breaking of the marriage bond, even for adultery, while they wink with great facility at infidelity to

\* The scene at the acquittal of Cole, charged with the murder of Hiscock, at Albany, was a singular one. Immediately upon the announcement of the verdict—not guilty—nearly every person in the court-room arose, those outside the bar mounting the seats, and from the audience there went up deafening cheers which lasted, despite the attempt to preserve order, for several minutes. Everybody present, even to the presiding judge, congratulated the prisoner on his release.

the marriage obligations. With a system of special dispensations that stops short of divorce, and with a system of penance for offenders against conjugal purity, they show a low ratio of divorces, but great immorality in conjugal life.

This historical digest of the general question of marriage and divorce brings us to the civil status of the question among ourselves.

§ 5. *The Civil Right of Legislation and the Courts in Divorce.*—The first and very obvious remark to be made here is that the law contemplates marriage as only a civil contract. Then, of course, legislation and the courts put it under the general management of contracts. So we are having separation and divorce and re-marriage with all the ease and almost frequency with which contracts and partnerships are managed in State Street.

It is true marriage is a contract, but it is vastly more. As a divine institution, inseparable from the scope of the seventh section of the Sinaitic Code, a moral element enters into it, above all human statutes, and independent of human choice. The leading feature of wedlock is a moral feature, and no state of social life, and no order of civil proceedings has a right to ignore this fact. Whether the State should compel parties in wedlock to live up to this principal and moral element in the bond is a separate question. But, certainly, it should not make assumption against the element, as if it were not there.

What, and how much, then, may the State do in the separation of married parties? It may only undo what it has done, and untie so much of the bond as it has made. All the civil and contract part of the bond is of the State, and the State, for reasons, may undo so much. That will leave the parties with the rest of the bond, the moral and the divine, still holding them. That is, it will remit the parties to the law of Christ and of Sinai. And here it may be said, in a general way, that the State must thus and ultimately dispose of all moral questions as questions simply of morals. It is not the province of

the State, nor does it come within the range of its ability, to force the citizen up to a perfect moral code. The farther society is removed from the family and patriarchal life and government, the less the State can have to do with morals, as such. So lying, profanity, filial disobedience, Sabbath-breaking, and such other wrongs as lie not against the person or property of another, must be left largely to the moral legislature and judiciary of advanced society, a power, in the main, organized and operative in the church of God. It must be permitted to the State silently to allow, or not legislate against many things in themselves sinful. How much of the moral wrong of society the State shall interfere with, is a simple matter of expediency, or good judgment, under the intention of doing the best it can for society.

But as experience as well as philosophy shows that moral ends are best gained by moral means, and that law is but a poor reformer, and must follow rather than lead, good judgment leaves moral issues to moral forces, using the law as the sailor does the ratchet of the capstan when heaving the anchor, to hold what another force has gained.

So we do not blame the State for not compelling parties in wedlock to live up to the moral tone of the institution as given by Christ. Nor are we disposed to complain that they sometimes grant separation from bed and board for desertion, habitual drunkenness, cruelty, &c. But we do make the point that it is neither right morally, nor wise civilly and socially, to grant and decree absolute divorce for other than the solitary Scriptural cause. It is not right, because, in so doing, the State steps over into the field of morals, and assumes to move bounds that Christ has fixed, and so to supplement his legislation on the question, and, as it were, to issue a revised code of New Testament morality. It is not wise, because, in so doing, the State undermines itself by undermining the family, which rests on the inviolability of the marriage bond. Granting divorce absolute, for these minor and only human reasons, and so permitting both parties to re-marry, demoralizes the institution,

and cheapens the family state before community. It is, moreover, assault direct, though, no doubt, not intended, on Christianity, since, by multiplying human reasons for divorce, over the single divine one, it arrays State legislation against New Testament legislation. And this will appear the more blameworthy in the State when we consider that the single cause for which divorce may be rightfully granted, adultery, is not originally and inherently a sufficient cause for divorce, but granted by God, in simple expediency, because of the hardness of the human heart.

Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the State should never allow divorce but for adultery, and should grant separation from bed and board, which gives no right to re-marry, only very carefully and very rarely.

§ 6. *The Duty of the Church in the Matter of Divorce.*—So far as this question is one of morality and religion, the church must assume the responsibilities of it. Under Christ she is the great legislative, judicial and executive body on questions of morals. And her rule of moral right must be within herself as drawn from the Scriptures. A first notion of the church must be that simply meeting the requirements of civil law is not the limit of moral obligation within her limits. Living up to the civil law is by no means synonymous with living up to Christ's law. A Christian minister, therefore, has no right to unite again in marriage a woman divorced for adultery. First, because Christ forbids her second marriage; and secondly, because, in doing it, he would allow adultery in the man marrying her. "He who marrieth her who is put away, committeth adultery." The same, of course, is true concerning those divorced for lesser causes. The legal permit for such to re-marry, and for him to unite them, can be no defence to him at the moral bar of Christ and the church.

If members of the church dissolve or contract marriage according to the law of the State, but contrary to the law of Christ, the church should deal with them as offenders. Other-

wise, anti-christian human laws are approbated, Christ's law of marriage is slurred, and the conscience and teachings of the church on marriage are demoralized.

Already, many have been left unconsciously to form connections that the law of Christ forbids, because the church has failed in her legitimate use of "the power of the keys" in this thing. It should be made a moral point, distinct and clear, by the church, that a legal marriage is not, of necessity, a Christian marriage, and often is but legalized and adulterous cohabitation.

There is an apparent door of escape from these conclusions, as to the duty of the church, and it is this: Moses qualified the original law of marriage, as too stringent—accommodated it to the hardness of men's hearts, by allowing divorce for adultery. But being found still too stringent for expediency, may it not be farther relaxed? There is no Moses commissioned of God, as was the Hebrew lawgiver, to do it; and Christ's exposition and reiteration of the law effectually close any such door. We see, therefore, no barrier adequate to turn back the tide of immorality that is flooding society by this fearful increase of divorce, except the law of Christ, strictly interpreted and enforced. As the practice now tends, the family state, on which alone the civil and social state and the Christian virtues can be firmly established, is greatly endangered, and safety lies only in the law of Sinai as interpreted by our Lord.



## ARTICLE III.

ANOTHER LOOK FOR THOSE FACTORS OF THE  
ATONEMENT.

I AM moved to write this article by certain criticisms\* which this review has made upon an Essay of mine, entitled "Dr. Bushnell's Orthodoxy." I there find called in question the soundness of my principles of interpretation, the validity of my reasoning, the correctness of my faith, and even the sincerity of my professions respecting evangelical belief.

Having a desire to find out whatever error there may be in myself or my writings, I have *candidly* attended to these charges, and do here respond, "not guilty." The efforts noticed to invalidate the positions and conclusions of my pamphlet have not, in my judgment, succeeded. It is to prevent or correct the misapprehensions which may arise from those charges, and also to contribute to a further discussion of the subject in hand, that I now take my pen. I can hardly understand on what ground Dr. Magoun has viewed my pamphlet as "a defence for an assault on evangelical belief;" for I therein disclaimed any purpose of defending Dr. B. I professed my faith in the so-called Governmental theory of the Atonement, and thought I showed the sincerity of my profession by defending this view from what seemed to me some misinterpretations of it in the "Vicarious Sacrifice."

And even if we suppose that Dr. B. is, as some declare, an enemy of the real doctrine of the Atonement, and has written this book to overthrow it, am I to be charged with defending his evil design when I endeavor to meet his arguments by showing that he acknowledges what he proposes to refute? This would

\* These criticisms are found in the Book Notices of the "Congregational Review" for July, 1868, and in an Article by Dr. MAGOUN, in the January Number, 1869, entitled "The Rejected Factors of the Atonement."

be a statement of the case if Dr. B. is considered an opponent of the truth. And in that case I am not a defender of his efforts, but a defender of the true doctrine from them. And this is certainly fair play in contestants of thought. If one shows that his opponent is on his own ground, he has the victory.

If, on the other hand, Dr. B. is not an enemy of the doctrine of the Atonement, and they who so view him are in error, then surely I do no evil in the reasoning which tends to correct their false opinions of a man or a book.

And, moreover, it should be here stated, that in my pamphlet I did not claim that the "Factors of the Atonement" were all found in the "Vicarious Sacrifice," explicitly and openly stated in unexceptionable phraseology. I endeavored there to show the defects of his statements, and in order to find the full doctrine of the Atonement, I plainly acknowledged that I used some *logical inferences* from his teachings, which he himself would be slow to accept. Believing, however, that a person is responsible for the conclusions which are inherently connected with certain conceded premises, I included these truths, discovered only by a process of inference, among those more clearly acknowledged in his book. I was aware that in so doing, I made the book to have a more Orthodox look than it wears of itself, and more than the author desires. And I am still aware that the author prefers the shape of things in his book, to that shape which I give to them. As I said in my pamphlet, I was simply after the *truth* in the book, and so far as the result was a seeming defence of the book, this was entirely an incidental matter.

I propose in the following pages—

I. To tell what mode of interpretation I employed in reading Dr. Bushnell.

II. To defend the analysis or factors employed in my Essay from Dr. Magoun's attempt to rule them out of the discussion.

III. To accept Dr. Magoun's Analysis, factor by factor, and show that according to my reading, even these are virtually found in the "Vicarious Sacrifice."

I.—*Quo Modo?*

In the introduction to my former Essay I proposed "to get back of Dr. Bushnell's words, not accepting even contradictory terms to mean an actual contradiction, till I had seen that back of all there was a contradiction in ideas." This proposal has stirred the question, *Quo Modo?* "By what process does a critic of thought, expressed in words, get back of the words to the ideas?" I may best show my own method by presenting a like process employed by others, and even in the very article which condemns it.

The point of difficulty lies in defining the exact meaning of an author when he seems to use contradictory expressions.

There are four supposable ways in which to deal with such writings.

One way is to believe that the *seeming* contradictions are indeed *actual* contradictions in thought; which conclusion would of course render the writings worthless.

A second way is to accept what they say on the affirmative side of the question discussed, and ignore the words which seem to convey a negative meaning.

A third way is to accept what the author teaches on the negative side of the question discussed, and ignore what seems to help the affirmative.

A fourth way is to accept all the words in spite of their *seeming* contradictions, and seek to explain them so that they shall not contradict, but simply limit and explain each other.

Take an example from Scripture: "God tempteth no man." (James i. 13.) "God did tempt Abraham." (Gen. xxii. 1.) Here is an apparent contradiction. If we accept it as a *real* contradiction, then we reject the authority of Scripture. We may, however, receive the testimony that "God tempts no man," and not being able to explain what the "did tempt Abraham" means, simply ignore it. Or we may accept that he tempted Abraham, and ignore the first words that "God tempts no man." Or we may assume that there are some different meanings of the word *tempt*, and search to find them. By

attending to the original languages, and comparing Scripture with Scripture, we soon get back of the word to the two distinct ideas for which it stands; and, behold, all difficulty vanishes.

Apply these principles to the book I reviewed. You seem to agree with me that there are apparent contradictions in Dr. B.'s "Vicarious Sacrifice." You consent that—

"If we give his words the meaning commonly given to the language about this subject, we find him uttering what is like the truth, then adding what seems inconsistent with it; affirming something, then apparently denying it."

If now we conclude from such use of words that Dr. B. is verily full of contradictions, then he is simply *non compos mentis*, and unworthy of notice. And the way to treat his book is to show its worthlessness: *not* that it teaches error, but that it teaches *with authority neither error nor truth*. But, as a matter of fact, the book makes a show of worth, and commends itself to many minds as a production of no unstrung brain, but of a masterly intellect. They who charge it with teaching error, do in this charge consent to some strength of argument in it.

Assuming, then, that the book is worthy of attention, what shall we do with its *apparent contradictions*? It is possible to select from it many expressions, or even extended passages, which bear the appearance of error; and so put them together, apart from the words and arguments which bear the appearance of truth, that, in the mind, reading this one-sided presentation of the teachings of the book, the conviction is quite firmly secured that it teaches error. And it has seemed to me that this is the mode some have adopted in their treatment of the book.

It was this unfair treatment of the book which led me to my exposition of its contents. My desire was to see *fair play* in the contest, to show that there were to be found in it some teachings which had not been noticed. There is another and better way, which is, to assume that if the writer is indeed an able mind, his teachings must have some consistency with each

other, and then give our efforts to find out their harmony. As we compare Scripture with Scripture—observing how one word will modify another—that one word may mean something different in different contexts; that one evangelist has an idiom or phraseology differing from another, or spake his words for a different intent. We cannot begin to enumerate the very many things which come in for observation in determining the exact meaning of Scripture; in getting back of the letter to the ideas. Certainly we cannot get at the ideas except by means of the words expressing them; but we find no word in a single place or a single use which will give its own full meaning.

I do not believe our able thinkers are as liable to contradictions and inconsistencies, in very thought, as many claim. Most of such charges arise from an imperfect understanding of their words. I verily believe that most of the debates and controversies in the church have been made up chiefly of strifes about words. They are vast specimens of logomachy. Controversialists have very frequently concluded that certain teachings were inculcated by their opponents, even prejudged the case, before studying their words; and then have sought to turn those words against the truth.

A single sentence may be taken as a type of Dr. Bushnell's whole book. It shall be one that comes near to an exact contradiction in appearance:—

“No ground of forgiveness is wanted; but only that the forgiveness itself be executed in a way to save all the great interests of eternal authority and government.”—*Vic. Sac.*, p. 298.

Concerning this sentence, Dr. Magoun is mistaken in declaring that in my pamphlet I charge it with an actual contradiction, not to be defended even by the “ingenious doctrine of mental contents.” If he will read all I say of this sentence he will find that I do see it rescued from its appearance of contradiction by some true meaning.

My explanation reads thus:—

“Dr. B. gives the phrase, ‘ground of forgiveness,’ a meaning which hints

of a blood-thirsty passion in God, as though some ground-place of love must be provided in this before he can forgive. And it is true no such *ground* of forgiveness is needed." (See my pamphlet, p. 54.)

*Quo Modo?* By what process did I find this meaning in the phrase "*ground* of forgiveness?" How did I get back of the words to see it?

Let me answer by presenting Dr. Magoun's exposition of this sentence. He says:—

"Taking all his words together, Dr. B. evidently means that the moral effect on the sinner is all the way of saving authority and government that is needed."

I accept the above words from Dr. Magoun, which I italicize, as the full explanation of the *Quo Modo* in my exposition.

By taking all his words together, I went back of some single words and phrases and sentences which had the heterodox appearance and found truth. Dr. Magoun, by taking all his words together, goes back of some words, phrases and sentences which have an orthodox appearance, and finds error. I appeal. Am I guilty of any 'peculiar tactics?' Do I use a new and mysterious process? It is indeed striking when fully apparent, how differently Dr. Magoun and myself come at this sentence. Read the first clause alone—"No ground of forgiveness is wanted." Supposing this to be unlimited, here or elsewhere, and it is clearly contrary to truth. Read the second clause alone—"The forgiveness must be executed in a way to save all the great interests of eternal authority and government." Supposing this to be unlimited, here or elsewhere, and it is clearly an acknowledgment of truth, even the truths which many say he denies. When Dr. Magoun comes to this sentence he accepts the first clause, with its erroneous appearance, as teaching real error; and then "by some doctrine of mental contents," or by taking all the words together, takes away the truthful appearance of the second in order to make it harmonize with or not contradict the supposed error in the first clause. My mind accepts the truthful appearance of the second clause

as teaching very truth; that which some say he denies—and then by a like process with Dr. M., “by taking all the words together”—or by some doctrine of mental contents, I take away the erroneous appearance of the first so that it will harmonize with or not contradict the truth in the second clause.

How, then, shall we determine which of us has reached the true meaning? As the process is *by taking all his words together*, it follows that whichever will most candidly and completely take all his words together, will have the advantage in the interpretation. Says Dr. B.:—

“God gets a great part of his power to forgive, not by his mere love and suffering patience and divine sympathy in Christ, but also in part by the invigoration of his law and its moral impressions.”—*Vic. Sac.*, p. 298.

“Everything that we see, therefore, in the incarnate life and suffering death, is God magnifying the honors of his law by the stress of his own stupendous sacrifice.” (See further quotations under the first factor in the discussion.)

Such words seem utterly to refute the interpretation of Dr. Magoun, that “the moral effect on the sinner is all the way of saving authority and government which Dr. B. recognizes.” For here is declared, even with emphasis, that Christ’s sacrifice reaches the law *immediately, directly*, as an instrumentality for the further, ultimate end of healing souls. Here is proclaimed the necessity that the law be magnified before souls can be reached. We conclude, then, that Dr. Magoun’s exposition, which found no truth in the sentence we study, was obtained not by taking all his words together, but by *leaving out* some of the most important words in the book. Nevertheless, trusting implicitly to his result, that the second clause of this sentence has no truth in it which explains or modifies the apparent error in the first, he now entirely drops it, and uses the first clause alone; so declaring that Dr. B. teaches “that we need no ground of forgiveness at all.” The first clause, though it has so important a modification, is treated as if it stood alone.

We are reminded of the man who said that the Bible teaches “there is no God.” Being asked for his reference, he turned



to the fourteenth Psalm—"The fool has said in his heart, there is no God." Omitting the first clause, and reading the second unmodified, he showed, indeed, the declaration in the Bible, "There is no God."

In this manner is Dr. B. made to declare that "We need no ground of forgiveness."

Again from Dr. B. "Great as our guilt is, Christ can be our sponsor for all the wrong and damage of it."—"God suffers in Christ on account of evil, or with and for created beings under evil."

How does Dr. Magoun interpret such sound words: "Knowing what and how, and for what Christ is held to suffer, we know what this language means and does not mean. It is certainly in a sense very commonly disallowed and rejected."

Observe here, Dr. M. professedly gives a meaning to these words different from what their face would teach. How did *he* find this meaning? How did he get back of such truthful words to find erroneous ideas? When *his process* is understood, I shall feel safe from his charge of introducing "peculiar tactics" into my exposition of Dr. B.

Finally, in respect to the soundness of my principles of interpretation, has not this Review inadvertently born decisive testimony in its citation of Dr. B.'s declaration that "my pamphlet is the best exposition of his views that any critic has yet given"? Not that Dr. B. endorses my statements of his position without exception. He thinks he is not quite as orthodox as I make him appear. But still his word is that "I have come nearest to his real meaning of any of his reviewers." He probably knows what he means in his book; and he says that I have his ideas. Do I need further evidence that my *Quo Modo* was reliable?

Concerning my application of the syllogism to Dr. B.'s teachings, this Review says: "Dr. B. gave notice to the world, some years ago, in a preface on language, that he despised logic in theology, and could not away with it." And the exclamation is hence made, "What an idea to subject such a man's teach-

ings to the test of a syllogism!" My reply is, does a thinker release himself from an innate law of logic by simply denying it? If I deny a physiological law, am I not under it still? If I deny that arsenic will poison, am not I still subject to its fatal power? I suppose that those who believe in logic, or the syllogism, recognize its rule over all thinking and reasoning, and in a way no more to be abrogated than a law of matter. I still claim that it is just to subject every man's words to the test of a syllogism, whether he consents to such order or not, and to hold a writer to any conclusions which may syllogistically result from them.

## II.—MY ANALYSIS OR FACTORS.

Having attempted, *in vain*, as we have now seen, to prove that my mode of interpretation is unreliable, Dr. Magoun proposes next to destroy the whole force of my argument by simply showing that it is entirely outside of the subject under discussion. My so-called factors, he claims, "are not essential factors of the atonement at all." "Therefore, what boots it if Dr. B. holds every one of them ever so firmly?" In a word, Dr. M. endeavors to overthrow my argument by declaring it *ruled out of the discussion*. He reasons: "It quite passes belief that anybody ever thought that the atonement was something sinful by loosely speaking of sin as one of its constituent parts." "What can it mean to affirm that law is a factor of the atonement?" He occupies six full pages, in the assumption that somebody was so "absurd" as to consider sin, law, punishment, &c., constituent parts of the atonement as such.

To this I reply, all this is simply building a block-house with his own hands, that he may have something to overthrow; as if expecting, when that should fall, somebody might believe the structure of my argument had fallen. For I was *very specific* in defining what I meant by the term "factor;"\* that I did *no*. mean simply what was *in* the subject, but included also

\* See my Essay, p. 7.

what was *around* it; "the ideas needful as a preparation for understanding it, or in the acceptance of it." May I not, therefore, use his own appeal, "what boots it?" that in six full pages he has so well succeeded in showing an absurdity which originated and has existed only in his *own* imagination.

And, further, were my factors valid in the sense in which I used them? Are the subjects named, (1) justice, (2) law, (3) punishment, (4) sin, (5) law dishonored by sin, (6) law reinvested with honor by the sufferings and death of Christ, such as "are included in the atonement, or closely related to it"? I would confirm my position here by referring to any and every discussion of the atonement that has ever been made. Are not these subjects always included as the chief subject-matter? And more conclusively, even with the force of a demonstration, do we refer to Dr. Magoun's own discussion in the article we now study, since we here find that these same six subjects make up the subject-matter of *all his* thoughts. With a little care I could classify all his reasonings under the factors of my analysis; and, as I am to show very soon, can arrange my argument under his factors. How strange that he should propose to rule these subjects out of the discussion in hand, and then go on to make up a discussion of his own, in which hardly anything else besides these six subjects are treated! We have seen grammars, by different authors, in which the substance of instruction was very similar, but the "tables of contents" were quite differently arranged and worded. What kind of criticism would it be for one of these authors to say of other treatises than his own, that they had nothing to do with the science of language, simply because their "tables of contents" were not like his own? Such is the criticism by Dr. Magoun of my factors.

And in one place he reasons that I must be ignorant of the subject in hand—the atonement—simply because I propose not to confine myself to its constituent parts, but to include those closely related. He seems to persist that I should discuss its elements, *per se*, and pass by their relations.

Of course, after such words, I look forward to see in his reasoning what he demands of me. But, lo! he does not get through his first factor, not even through the statement of it, without going out of the constituent parts of the atonement into its relations; yes, into just exactly some of the relations I had dwelt on, and which he had ruled out of the discussion. His very first factor is "the relations of the atonement to the divine law," which is no more nor less than one of my own factors. And when he sees his thoughts gliding thus out of the simple essence into some relations, he gracefully acknowledges it thus. See p. 19:—

"We may seem to be dwelling upon the articulations of the atonement in the scheme of salvation, rather than upon a part of the atonement itself. But the question, what is Christ's sacrifice for? is substantially the question, what is it? Decide the point where his work must join on the lost condition of man, and you decide what his work is."

Is not this an unmistakable acknowledgment that even the whole subject of the atonement may be settled by studying its relations? Where, we ask, is "the point in which Christ's work joins on to the lost condition of man," even in his own scheme, if not just where I stated in my factors—law, sin, punishment, justice?"

What, then, is the marked difference between the subject-matter in Dr. Magoun's discussion and in my own? It seems to be about this: I study the relations of law to the atonement; he studies the relations of atonement to law. I study the relations of penalty to the atonement; he studies the relations of the atonement to penalty.

We now approach a different phase of the contest. For I do by no means consent that my sixth factor is not a constituent part of the atonement, even in the most essential meaning. Indeed, it sounds to me as strange language for an orthodox man to make any such negation. See how it looks on paper! "Law, reinvested with honor by the sufferings and death of Christ, is no constituent part of the atonement!" Here, observe, are cause and effect; the sufferings and death of

Christ magnifying the law and making it honorable ; and all this is no essential part of the atonement ! Ought I not here to make a charge of heresy on my opponent ? Suppose Dr. Bushnell had used this language ! But hold ; I will give my opponent the benefit of the " mental contents " theory of interpretation, and so recognize in this declaration the climacteric point in his criticism.

Dr. Magoun does not take it for granted that " any kind of suffering by Christ which honors the law is a part of the atonement." He says :—

" That sort and measure of honor which Dr. B. believes Christ put upon the law is quite a different thing from that other sort and measure of it which orthodox believers ascribe to a certain unique relation which His sufferings and death sustain to law." (See p. 13.)

I recognize here a statement of the real issue in the discussion. It is not enough to constitute orthodoxy, that one should believe that Christ conferred honor upon the law ; but, more exactly, he must believe in a certain peculiar *sort* and *measure* of honor.

We are now to examine Dr. Magoun's scheme that we may find out exactly what is the orthodox quality and quantity of honor which Christ confers upon the law ; and then observe how different, if at all, is the quality and quantity of honor for the law in Dr. Bushnell's scheme. Finding in no few words of Dr. Magoun a statement of the test for distinguishing different qualities of honor, nor the measure for determining its quantity, we suppose he professes to present the same in the combined teachings of his different factors. To these, then, we now attend, comparing with them the teachings of Dr. Bushnell on the points they present, that we may see wherein they agree or differ.

## III.—COMPARISON OF THE SCHEMES.

DR. MAGOUN.\*

"The first factor of the Atonement is that the design of Christ's sacrifice, its specific object, was to affect directly and immediately the objective relations of men to the administration of the Divine Law."

"Dr. Bushnell says the sacrifice is for a subjective effect, not objective." (Read opposite, and see.)

"The question is whether the passion and work of the Son of God take first effect upon the moral character of men—as being only a spiritual influence, or intended only for their influence on men—or upon the governmental relations of men, i. e. which of the two ends logically has precedence of each other." "The accepted doctrine of the atonement says the latter; Dr. Bushnell denies and asserts the former." (Look again.)

"Governments *among men* exist for the good of the governed. The Divine Government is of another order; the Divine Governor of another rank of being. His glory is a higher end than the good of men or angels. But Dr. B. everywhere makes God's side of government tributary to man's." (Look again.)

"The whole 'moral view,' so called, inverts the proper dignity and rank of ends in our Lord's work. It elevates the renovation of men above its proper place in the scale of ends, and makes the last first and the first last." (p. 18.)

(Is it so in Dr. B., opposite?)

"To quote all the passages in which Dr. Bushnell denies that the death of

DR. BUSHNELL.\*

"What now do we see in the sacrifice of Christ, but that he is doing all for the violated honor and broken sovereignty of law. Everything we see, therefore, in the incarnate life and suffering death, is God magnifying the honors of his law by the stress of his own stupendous sacrifice. Such an amount of feeling put into the governmental order, commends it to our feelings, and also turns our feeling into awe before it. The law is raised as a precept in this manner to a new pitch of honor, and the power of impression given to it by the vicarious sacrifice of Jesus, is the principal cause of that immense progress in moral sensibility and opinion that distinguishes the Christian populations of the world." (p. 302.)

"Christ honors the precept, not only in what he does for our sake, in restoring us to it, and forgiving us in it, but quite as much, in what he does for its sake, to restore and save it also. For how shall he so magnify the law, as by setting it on high, enthroning in love, organizing it in a kingdom worthy of its breadth, beneficence, dignity, and all encompassing order. We often magnify Christ's work as being a work of salvation for men, because it is in this view that it makes an appeal so persuasive to human feeling; but there is nothing he would spurn himself, with a more total disallowance than the thought of a salvation gotten up for men, one side of the grand, everlasting

\* The quotations from Dr. M. are from his article. The quotations from Dr. B. are from his "Vicarious Sacrifice." Words in parenthesis are my own, and the Italics are generally made by myself.

Christ takes immediate effect upon the objective relations of a lost world would be quite needless."

(I am quoting, opposite, some which *affirm* this "objective relation," and have found *none* in his book which absolutely deny it.)

"Dr. Bushnell's atonement is nothing but reconciliation, and no atonement at all; it is not towards God, but towards man" (p. 10.)

(Look opposite.)

"A reader of Dr. Bushnell's book can hardly fail to realize that he rejects this commonly and universally recognized factor of the doctrine," (which the "moral view" doctrine rejects,) "which affirms the Divine end in it, and the way in which it contemplates effecting human salvation."

(Look opposite.)

ing law, in which God's empire stands. We greatly mistake, if we think that Christ is doing everything here, as prosecuting a suit before human feeling, and to bring human souls out of trouble; he wants to bring them into righteousness, and that again, not for their sakes only, but a great deal more for righteousness' sake; to heal the elemental war, and settle everlasting order, in that good law which is the inherent principle of order." (p. 300.)

"Not even the transcendent moral power over mankind, which Christ has obtained by his incarnate life and sacrifice, can have sufficient sway, save as it is complemented, authenticated, and sharpened into cogency by the sturdy *law-work* of these three chapters."

"It is one of the most remarkable facts in the history of Christian doctrine, that what the critical historians call the "moral view" of the atonement—in distinction from the expiatory—has been so persistently attempted, and so uniformly unsuccessful." (p. 398.)

"The one fatal defect that vitiates all conceptions, ['moral view' conceptions, he means,] and puts them under a doom of failure, is, that they make up a gospel which has no law side of authority, penal enforcement, rectoral justice; nothing to take hold of an evil mind at the point of its indifference or aversion to good; nothing to impress conviction or shake the confidence, or stop boldness of transgression." (p. 399.)

"Expecting, as Christ does, to draw all men by the captivating love and grace of his sacrifice, he has no such thought as that the moral power of his life will do anything by itself. There must be *law*, conviction, judg-



ment, fear, taking hold of natures dead to love, and by this necessary first effect preparing a way for love. No effective and firm hold of the world as world, does he even hope to get, save as he breaks the shell of the world's audacity and blunted feeling; by these piercing rigors of conviction—*doing visibly and suffering all that he does and suffers, in a way to honor the precept, enforce the penalty, and sanctify the justice of law*; the precept as right, the penalty as righteous, the justice as the fit vindication of the righteousness of God.

*"No moral view account of his gospel, separated from this, can be anything but a feeble abortion."* (p. 401.)

I understand this first factor of Dr. Magoun to claim for the atonement some law-ward or God-ward work which shall specially distinguish it from the "moral view" theory. Would he had developed, in some degree, what he means by "the administration of Divine Law." Can he mean anything else than such an exhibition and enforcement of it as shall most tend to control men, to affect their hearts and conduct? Is not that administration of the Divine Law, with which we have to do, wholly a man-ward thing, some work or exercise of God to reach and affect man's sensibilities and will? Is not that which Dr. B. calls the "law side of authority," "penal enforcement," "rectoral justice," the simple result of the Divine Law administered; to secure which, Christ's sacrifice affects the law? Certain it is, that to work some change in the Divine Law, which shall give it new power upon our convictions, judgment, and fear, is "affecting the objective relations of man; i. e. his relations to the Divine Law."

I think the above quotations from Dr. B. will show conclusively, that he not only recognizes this law-work of Christ's sufferings and death, but emphasizes it with great earnestness. And, further, it is a mistake to say that he presents no effect

secured on the law except through an intervening man-ward change first secured. Rather the law is reached *directly, immediately*, by Christ's work, as the effect to be first secured, in order to work that change in man. I was not mistaken, as your Review declared, when I so stated this order in my essay. The order plainly is, not first man reformed, then the law by this reformation is honored; but first the law is honored, and by this is man reformed. Nor does he subordinate the glory secured by honoring the law to the glory of saving or healing souls; but see how he makes the salvation of man a small matter compared with the glory of his work for God's universal kingdom. And after the criticisms given above, which Dr. B. makes upon the "moral view" doctrine, I see not how he is any more to be classed with Socinians or Unitarians. For who more than he has pictured the feebleness of that teaching which proposes to save men or honor God by telling of his tenderness and compassion; while leaving untold his severity, his justice, his exacting law, which spared not from its pangs his only begotten Son. These, certainly, are the objective relations of man to the divine government.

## DR. MAGOUN.

*Second Factor.*

"The atonement produces this objective effect by removing the difficulty that prevented the exercise of divine mercy."

"This difficulty is not that God is too hard-hearted and malicious to forgive sin, and that the Son by his pains softens the Father's heart towards men."

"We must not find the ground of the atonement in any such spirit of animosity."

"But there are obstacles of another sort in the character, government and infinite interests of God, and the nature and relations of holiness and sin which no subjective moral change in men, nor any work of Christ—whose

## DR. BUSHNELL.

"Christ produces an impression on our minds of the essential sanctity of God's law and character, which it was needful to produce, and without which any proclamation of pardon would be dangerous."

"Sin dishonors the law, breaks it down, tramples it in customary contempt."

"God must command for his government a character of justice, which will enforce his law, create respect for it and for the ruler, and give the emphasis of immovable authority to his word and will."

"His forgiveness itself must be executed in a way to save all the great interests of eternal authority and government."

end is such a moral change—can remove.”

“God must govern by no fast and loose method, surrender nothing to chance or caprice, or the inability to inflict pain.”

Would that Dr. Magoun had unfolded more fully the sort and measure of the difficulty preventing the exercise of divine mercy, as it lies in his mind. He gives us simply a negative description of it, and that very meagre. Since the question he proposed, in distinguishing different kinds of honor which Christ might give the law, requires very exact distinctions to be made, it is to be lamented that he did not attempt to make these distinctions clear. But he simply states his points, without unfolding them. In the understanding of him, then, we must simply revert in our minds to what we have learned as the common meaning of his factors.

The difficulties preventing the exercise of divine mercy lie in the interests of His government. They are, we suppose, made by sin. Are they not all included in the dishonored condition of the divine law? Sin destroys the authority of God's law. It tends to subvert government. Here, then, is the difficulty in the way of mercy; in the way of releasing sinners from the punishment due their sin. The power of law is down, trampled upon, has not been enforced; and who will believe in its sanctity if nothing be done to show it? How will it gain its true place of ability to secure conviction, respect, fear and obedience?

It is quite important that we give a definite statement here of the difficulty in the way of divine mercy. For upon the nature of this will depend the “sort and measure of honor” which is to be needed for reinstating the law. It is not enough to say that this difficulty lies in the infinite interests of God's government and character. In what part of his government? In what part of his character? In what particular interest pertaining to them? Dr. Magoun does not tell us. He simply declares that the difficulty is such “that no simple moral change in man can remove it, and no work of Christ acting simply through or

by means of securing this change." What, then, is it? Can we know? Is it visible? Is it revealed? Is it in heaven or on the earth? Dr. Magoun does not answer. If I recall the instructions received when in the seminary, in the elucidations of this matter, they are very much like the statements of Dr. Bushnell. The whole problem is one in God's moral government over men.

"A necessary part of this government is the authority of the Ruler. This authority is, definitely, the binding force or influence of the law on the subject." (Here it is, then, in range of our observation, for study. It is an influence on the subject, on man.) "And, further, it is established by showing that he who rules has the right to command which imposes obligation to obey. This being done"—i. e. this showing—"all is done which can give force to law, or invest it in the view of subjects with that characteristic which constitutes it an authoritative rule of action."—*Taylor's Moral Gov.*

Now, when sin has come in among the subjects, it works damage in this authority, which nothing but penalty, or a substitute for penalty, can make good. Here is the difficulty preventing divine mercy. The damaged condition of this influence of God's law upon men's minds. The subverted authority forbids that the disobedient receive mercy. It is the atoning work of Christ to remove this difficulty. The special "sort and manner of honor" to be looked for in Christ's suffering, is that which will exalt this law of God from its dishonored state. This is the kind Dr. B. provides, and Dr. M. has shown no other kind.

#### DR. MAGOUN.

3. "The method of removing this difficulty in the way of exercising mercy to sinners is *Substitution*."

"Atonement loses all the meaning it has gotten in evangelical belief, if this conception of substitution is excluded."

"Dr. Bushnell renounces the meaning and denies the substitution."

(See opposite whether he does.)

"The ground upon which God judges the sufferings of Christ to be,

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"In the fact that Christ's incarnation, life and death upon the cross—all that I have included in his vicarious sacrifice—are the fruit of his own free homage to the law, we have in one word; his deific obedience."

(Thus this obedience includes his sufferings and death; his full sacrifice.)

"It is obvious enough that in such a way of obedience Christ makes a contribution of honor to the law he

in a penal sense, equivalent to the sufferings of all his people, is *not the nature or degree* of that suffering, but the *dignity* of the sufferer.

"*Penal*, when applied to Christ's sufferings, is not penal in the same sense as when applied to the sufferings of men."

"The sufferings of Christ are *made sufficient* to justice, though they are not what justice demands. The execution of law would satisfy; so do they."

obeys, that will do more to enthrone it in our reverence than all the desecrations of sin have done to pluck it down." "More, too, than all conceivable punishment to make it felt and kept in respect."

"Many apprehend damage from the full remission of sin, lest it should leave the law trampled, and without vindication, and reveal a kind of indifference to it in God, that will be fatal to all due impressions of its authority, and sanctity. Here, then, over against all such damages, and apprehended mischiefs of laxity, we now place the momentous, and grandly impressive fact, of Christ's obedience—his obedience unto death."

(Is not this like the old truth, that Christ's obedience restores to the law more honor than sin has taken from it. He more than fills the place of punishment in enthroning it in our reverence.)

"Grant that here is no contrived compensation to law, is it any the less truly compensated, any the less sacred, and honorable, and powerful on the lost world's feeling, that he has glorified it forever in their sight by his simple obedience." (p. 314.)

"His power which came out of the law came back also upon it, and made it a greater power than either the obedience or the punishment of all past ages could." (p. 317.)

"Justice is satisfied by whatever makes good the dishonors of a violated law." (p. 260.)

"Christ has set the law precept in a position of honor, such as it otherwise never could have had." (p. 321.)

(What, we ask, can prevent the mind filling out the third term in the syllogism, therefore, "CHRIST HAS SATISFIED JUSTICE.")

Observe, the substitution here is very clearly defined. "Christ has done for the law more than punishment or penalty could have done." What does penalty do for the law? Let Dr. Taylor answer. (*Moral Gov.*, Vol. II., p. 96.) "The peculiar influence of legal sanctions (which is simple penalty,) is to establish or ratify in the view of his subjects the authority of the moral governor." This authority, we have already seen, is the binding force of his will, expressed in law; its influence upon the subjects, which influence on the subjects is established by *showing* in some way that the ruler has a right to command which imposes an obligation to obey. "Nothing besides this showing," this exhibition, "can be done to give the law all the binding force which law can have."

The reasoning is: There are two ways in which to make this show of the divine authority, to furnish this irresistible evidence of God's right to rule, and the binding force of his law; first, by annexing penalties to his law and executing them upon the disobedient; second, by revealing the same in the sufferings and death of Christ. Christ, by his work and death, makes as full a show of God's authority, of the binding force of his law, as would be made in the execution of the penalty of the law.

Here, I say, is a mode of substitution which I learned when studying theology. It is given as the substance of the so-called governmental theory of the atonement; and I repeat my full conviction that this substitution is found in Dr. Bushnell's scheme as clear as sunlight. I do not say that Dr. B. sees the same exhibition in the death of Christ which all other people do; that he acknowledges all the phases to it on which some have dwelt; but simply this: he does acknowledge the generally accepted *result* from Christ's death, that it is a full equivalent, and even more than an equivalent, for the penalty, in establishing the authority of God, and the sanctity of his law.

As to the way in which Dr. B. represents Christ bearing the curse for us, this should be said: His "corporate curse," i. e. Christ suffering in the way of enduring natural evil, will seem great or small to us, compared with the other view of a direct

and supernatural infliction of evil, according as we get his idea of divine personality in nature. If one persists against this union, and will call nature some inanimate, impersonal force, and give the evils coming in a natural order no place in the divine economy, then, of course, this theory must be quite imperfect. But I fail to see how our omnipresent God is to be so excluded from nature. I repeat what I said in my essay, that I see not how evils, coming in the order of nature, are not as directly and expressively from God as those an angel might inflict.

Dr. Magoun thinks such statements are a simple "attempt to sink the positive and personal in the natural." He errs in so judging me. My attempt is, not to sink, but to bring up and out into bold relief the positive and personal which are in nature. They seem to me now to be sunk there, as it were, out of sight, and they need to be brought again into view. And when nature is reinstated, to be what God meant it should be, not a veil to hide himself, but a glass through which to see him; a piece of his own workmanship, in which to find his mind in all its infinite workings; both the warmth of his love and the fire of his indignation; then, and not till then, shall we learn the precious lesson, and realize the inestimable blessing of a God ever with us. It is by no means the full picture of our God to say he is our governor in a literal meaning; so comparing his relations to us, or rather confining them to the narrow limits of the power an earthly ruler has.

God is not only over us, but in us, also. He planned our very being, and is now dwelling in the very constitution of our soul and body; so that every pain and every joy, every motion is derived from him. "In him we live and move and have our being." We could not so do in any literal governor. God is more to us than a governor, in any sense we ever gave that word. And all our knowledge of God, expressed in words of governmental origin, are simply figurative.

It is unfair to represent what Dr. B. calls the "corporate curse" theory of Christ's sufferings in the light of simple,



impersonal natural consequence. This is no language of his. It by no means expresses his full meaning. Rather, in this order, he sees "retributive causations," "the way of God's justice," "the mode of God's discipline for transgressors." This so-called natural order of evil is the very order of God, the way of his direct and positive working on souls, the very "curse" itself in operation or execution. And it is only by introducing into our view this immediate connection with God of the evils endured in the corporate curse, that we see it as he does, or at all harmonize it with our common views of Christ suffering from the very hand of God. If, however, we do admit this personality into nature, then this picture is not so far off from the more common view, of Christ's suffering what God places on him.

And more: if we calculate the worth of this explanation by its making clear the adaptation of Christ's sufferings to the end in view, which is the exhibition of the binding force of God's law, it seems to have an advantage over the theory of a supernatural infliction. For, in the corporate curse, Jesus is under and suffering from the very laws which he would ratify or establish. He can turn back their force if he will, but he does not. He is in a work of saving souls, which would seemingly justify him in breaking the common order; but still he makes no infringement. He submits to the law. He submits to its very curse. Here, certainly, is some unique relation of Christ's sufferings and death to sustain law. God let the law burden him, and curse him, rather than loosen in the least its rigor.

Here, we say, is a transaction which makes visible its fitness to support the law. We see its adaptations. They are no longer there, in a way we know not how, in great mystery, but we *behold* them reaching even to the ratifying of God's law; making evident that God will execute his law in the fulness of its requirements.

Need I refer to the many puzzling questions which have been put respecting that other view of Christ's sufferings, which takes them out of nature, out of any law which we *discern*, out of any

relation which is now *visibly* prevailing in God's rule of man ; and makes them some wondrous, mysterious, inexplicable, supernatural result of the divine infliction. How do such sufferings stand related to the interests of God's government ? Wherein is their adaptation to the support of law ? How is justice satisfied ? What kind of justice is thus exhibited ? What volumes have been written to answer these questions, and all without securing any uniform and universal satisfaction for the wonder to be solved ?

Far be it from me to say, that in this view of Christ's sufferings and death which I now call worthy, is included the *full exhibition* of their meaning and intent. By no means. I leave room there to be very much beyond what I can see, and certainly beyond what is here unfolded. I profess not that all the relations of Christ's death are seen in the "corporate curse." But this much we say: whatever of the invisible, the mysterious, there may be in the whole exhibition, in this view there is brought into our vision some part to be understood, some adaptations to an end in view, which is the exaltation and eternal honor of the law on which sin had trampled.

Such, then, is the "sort and measure of honor" conferred upon the law by Christ's sufferings and death, in the scheme I seem to find in the "Vicarious Sacrifice." I dare appeal, what other or different sort and measure of honor does the law need than that which, as Dr. Taylor says, "gives it all the binding force which law *can* have" ? If Dr. Magoun has an idea of some better sort and measure of honor than this, we shall give most earnest attention when he unfolds it.

I fail to find any different sort in his scheme ; and as to the quantity of this sort furnished, Dr. Bushnell far exceeds him.

DR. MAGOUN.

*Fourth Factor.*

"It is another factor of the atonement, that in the Divine government, this *substitution* of Christ—removing difficulties in the exercise of mercy, and acting immediately and directly

DR. BUSHNELL.

"There is some truth in the statement, that the Christian world is unanimous in the belief that Christ has offered a compensation to the justice of God, and that such compensation is necessary as a *ground for the*

upon the objective relation of sinners to the government—is the *reason for, or ground of, the forgiveness of sins.*”

“This factor is held alike by those who conceive that the necessity for such a work as Christ’s is to be found in the Divine nature, and by those who find it in the nature of government and the demands of public good.”

“Dr. B. denies this factor and both these views.”

(Read opposite, and see if he does.)

“He denies any immediate reason for the forgiveness of sins, save the renewed character of the sinner.”

“Dr. B. says there is no ground for forgiveness, for none is needed.”

“He denies that the new birth is the *condition* of acceptance with God, and elevates it to the rank of *cause*.”

“So far as individuals are concerned, the man-ward effect of Christ’s sacrifice, (i. e. the new birth,) is a *condition precedent*, (to forgiveness, or acceptance,) but it does nothing towards giving validity or virtue to the atonement itself.”

*forgiveness of sins.* And I have no pleasure in raising a conflict with any so generally accepted faith and opinion.

“But,” [i. e. rather than raise such a conflict,] “I have made up as large an account of compensations as any one can desire, if a compensation must be provided.”

“And I am clear in the conviction that the view advanced (in my compensations) has the particular merit of giving to all the strong substitutional, or imputational phrases applied to Christ in Scripture, their most easy and genuinely natural meaning.” (Vic. Sac., p. 394.)

“Whosoever, then, is pressed with the necessity that some ground of forgiveness should be prepared by Christ in order to make forgiveness safe—some compensations made to law and justice for the loss they must suffer in the release of their penalties—has not far to go to find the matter of a compensation that is more than sufficient. Let him remember first the tremendous artillery sanctions added by Christ in his two really new doctrines, that of eternal punishment, and that of his coming in glory to judge the world; and then again let him consider Christ in his whole lifetime, wrestling with God’s retributions upon the world, himself included under them, and finally drinking dry upon the cross the cup of judicial madness which these retributions mix in the hearts of his enemies; and then once more let him note how he carefully refuses to subvert the retributive causalities of God’s judicial order in souls, even though it be to accomplish their deliverance—let him bring together these most weighty tributes of honor, added by Christ to the majesty of law—and whether he shall call

them compensations or not, he will certainly not be concerned any more lest God, in the forgiveness of sins, may have sacrificed the honors of his authority or the majesty of his justice. (p. 390.)

Whatever Dr. Bushnell's language may be, has he not exhibited the *thing* which is very generally accepted as "the ground of forgiveness"? His compensations, if accepted, go at once to make up that part of the atonement. Moreover, I fail to find in his book any full denial of the phrase. He seems to give it some respect, though he cannot use it without much limitation and explanation. And we have seen even in Dr. Magoun's words, this caution:—

"We must take heed that we do not conceive of God as being unpropitious, malevolent and revengeful. We must not find the ground of the Atonement to lie in any such spirit of animosity." (p. 21.)

I imagine that this is just about what Dr. B. means when he denies some *so called* ground of forgiveness. Another great fault of Dr. B., we are told, is that he exalts the new birth, or the man-ward effect of Christ's sacrifice,—the new character,—to rank as a cause of forgiveness, rather than a condition. Now, he ought to recognize here the ambiguity which very easily may exist. For we all consent that the same change in character is absolutely needful before God will forgive. In Dr. Magoun's language, "penitence" in the man,—one result of Christ's work,—is a "*condition precedent*" of forgiveness.

We have, then, two "conditions precedent" of forgiveness—*Christ's sacrifice*, and one effect of that sacrifice, *penitence*. God will no more forgive without penitence, than he will forgive without the work Christ wrought for the law. Both alike are demanded by the interests of his government.

And we may notice some respects in which this change in character may more properly be called the reason of *actual* forgiveness, than may the work on the law by Christ's death. Thus, according to Webster, a cause is that which produces an

effect. Now, Christ's sacrifice never produces the effect—forgiveness—of itself, aside from penitence in the subject forgiven. In one meaning, the so called ground or cause of forgiveness is simply a cause or ground for a *possible*, not an *actual* forgiveness. The atonement, then,—one condition precedent to a soul's forgiveness,—may exist without securing that result. But this cannot be said of the other "condition precedent"—penitence. For penitence is a "condition precedent" which invariably is followed by forgiveness. Not indeed without the virtue of the atonement,—the other condition precedent; but still, if we simply notice the relation of antecedent and consequent, penitence has this advantage over the atonement,—using this word as does Dr. M.,—that while the atonement is not surely followed by forgiveness, penitence *invariably* has this consequent.

But though we thus contrast penitence and the atonement, let us observe, penitence cannot exist independent of the atonement. Penitence is one result of the atonement. As the effect presupposes the cause, penitence implies the work and efficacy of the atonement. We see, then, that penitence may be used as *embracing in its meaning* the atoning work, and thus gain an advantage over the term which refers to that work disconnected from penitence. Since, then, penitence, or the new character, is *such* a "condition precedent" of salvation; absolutely needful, in that salvation cannot be accomplished without it; absolutely certain, in that salvation invariably follows, it may not improperly be said to embrace, in its relations to salvation, those also of the atonement. It is doubtless in this inclusive sense that Dr. B. uses the new character, when he *seems* to exalt it above Christ's work. He is in fact making no such contrast as is supposed between the atoning work, or law, and the new life, but simply is making expression of the complete work of Christ in accomplishing salvation; not simply a possible, but an actual salvation. And I have heard preachers who need to make some such change in their way of presenting Christ, who have dwelt so much on the ground of a merely *possible* forgiveness, that they seemed to be little

acquainted with the ground of *actual* forgiveness and a completed salvation.

DR. MAGOUN.

*Fifth Factor.*

"Christ's substitutionary work thus related to divine government and human forgiveness, is the great intent of this earthly mission. It is in the plan, and central in it."

"Every body admits that men are regenerated in character as a result of Christ's whole work, and that this was his ultimate end, so far as man is concerned." (p. 18.)

DR. BUSHNELL.

"Nothing is so conspicuous in the vicarious sufferings and death of Christ, as the solemn deference he pays to God's instituted justice."

"We may sum up all that Christ taught, and did, and suffered, in the industry of his life and the pangs of his cross, and say that the one comprehensive, all-inclusive aim that draws him on is the change he will operate in the spiritual habit and future well-being of souls."

This factor, it will be seen, is simply an expression of the order in which one part of Christ's work stands, as related to other parts and the whole. Very little is said in unfolding this factor. It is simply stated, and then are added some quotations from Dr. Bushnell which seem to differ, or, as he says, to deny it. To show the full idea of this order prevailing in the two minds we are comparing, I give two quotations from each, one of which shows what is esteemed the ultimate end in all Christ's work, and the other what is considered the chief part in the plan and work which is executing or bringing to pass the ultimate result. Both agree that the ultimate end, so far as man is concerned, is the regenerated character. Dr. M. uses the term "ultimate." Dr. B. says this is his "one all-inclusive aim." Is not the ultimate aim or end sought the one that includes all subordinate ends and aims employed in seeking it? And is not every end sought in securing the final one in a true sense subordinate, and in some sense incidental? We have it then from both that the substitutional work of Christ in honoring the law is but a means to an end. This one thing which he did was not done for itself, but as a part in a plan, as a means to a further end of regenerating character. Then it will follow. Christ came not here to suffer and die, as if this suffering and death were the chief or ultimate end of his work,

but these he endured in accomplishing his ultimate end, the saving of men. As I understand, this is all that Dr. B. proclaims. It is an inference from Dr. Magoun's words, and from the words of many writers on the atonement. And further, if we compare his substitutional work in sustaining God's authority with other parts of his work in the great plan, both consent that this part was the chief one. It was "central" in it, says Dr. M. It was the "most conspicuous" part, says Dr. B. Where do they differ? The seeming difference of Dr. B. from common writers lies in that he has shown great jealousy lest this part in Christ's work should be allowed to overshadow the whole. If we compare Christ's love and sympathy, his teaching and healing, with his obedience unto death to God's instituted law, in order to exalt it and sanctify it in the eyes of the world, then Dr. B. gives the last the most conspicuous place. He could say with emphasis, this is in his plan, and central in it. I think Dr. B. has erred in applying to this part of his work the adjective incidental, and in taking so much pains to keep it out of a prominent place in the preconceived plan and eternal purpose of God. It must be consented that, in his caution here, he puts this part as almost *accidentally* occurring.

This is a bad shape in which to put the matter; but still the matter is there. While, then, as to the order of Christ's work, in the planning of it he can hardly be called correct, in the occurring of it, in its execution and results, he gets all parts in, and in the true order. While he may misconceive the *intent* of Christ's mission, he certainly apprehends that mission in its fulfilment.

It seems strange indeed that what he declares to be the "most conspicuous" thing in the whole work of Christ holds so small a place in Christ's preconceived plan. But then the atonement lies not in Christ's simple intention or plan, but in what he did. To be correct in the actual work of Christ is more important than to solve what he intended to do.

And now the two schemes are fully before us for comparison. And I do sincerely ask to be shown where is that "peculiar



sort and measure of honor" for the law, which was to be more orthodox than that sort and measure of honor set forth in the scheme of the "Vicarious Sacrifice." We have failed to find it. But we shall keep our eyes open to discover it, whenever it may appear. Factor by factor we have considered this analysis of the atonement, and seem to find something corresponding to each one in the book under consideration.

Our conviction is then renewed that the factors of the atonement are virtually recognized in the "Vicarious Sacrifice." They are not in the most orderly way there arranged. It seems not to have been the design of the book to present a symmetrical view of the doctrine, but to expurgate from it some heathen notion of the Deity. The order of his thought is thus determined by this all-absorbing purpose to refute something. This shapes, and sometimes ill shapes his arguments. But of this I have spoken elsewhere.

I have been profited by Dr. Bushnell's writings. This, however, I could not acknowledge with more force than was in the simple testimony of the last pages in the January Congregational Review. And is it strange, when so much profit is found from any words, that I suspected there was truth there in some shape? Is it possible for poison to nourish our bodies? Is it possible for error to nourish our souls? Is there not a reason for my mode of criticizing Dr. B. in which I seek not to condemn and refute him, but to sift his words, and take what precious teachings they contain? This is all my endeavor. Please accept my professions as the fulness of my intent.

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## LITERARY NOTICES.

*Companion to the Bible.* By Rev. E. P. BARROWS, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature. pp. 639. American Tract Society: 150 Nassau Street, New York.

If there be any one demand of our time which needs to be met, fairly and fully, it is the demand for the proofs of Christianity. The "evidences" generally given have not been satisfactory. Men have a right to ask, and the intelligent believer is bound to answer why he believes the Bible to be the word of God. Many of the evidences have assumed the Bible to be what believers claim, and upon that assumption have proceeded to demonstrate certain truths. But the demand is to know on what ground the Scriptures are entitled to a place above other books, and we repeat it is the duty of the Christian world to answer.

This work is a highly commendable effort in the right direction. "The First Part," we learn from the preface, "contains a concise view of the evidences of revealed religion. Here, since Christianity rests on a basis of historic facts, special prominence has been given to the historic side of these evidences." Our expectations were more than realized by the fairness and "concise" completeness of this part of the work. Here the inquirer may learn when there were no written gospels, and when there came to be such works, and the accompanying proof, outside of revelation. The internal evidences are also carefully considered.

Part second discusses such interesting topics as "Names and External Form of the Old Testament," "The Original Text and its History," "Formation and History of the Hebrew Canon," "Ancient Versions of the Old Testament," &c. These points are presented with an amount of research and a spirit of candor unusual in such aids to the Scriptures.

In part third are full and pertinent remarks on "The New Testament Text and its History," "Formation and History of the New Testament Canon," and "Ancient Versions of the New Testament." Of course, in a work of this size, these topics could not be exhausted, but there is enough to put the inquirer in the road to knowledge, if he be not satisfied with the results here given.

In the appendix to part third is given an account of the writings of the "apostolic fathers," and also of the "Apocryphal New Testament writings."

Part four concludes the book with a full discussion on the "principles of biblical interpretation."

The work is not a commentary in any sense of the word, though it sometimes incidentally elucidates a difficult question, or throws light into some dark passage. It is an honest and successful effort "to give to those who ask us a reason of the hope that is in us." The author has done a good work in helping us "to understand and be able to set forth, with clearness and convincing power, the proofs that this plan of salvation has God for its author."

*Chips from a German Workshop.* By MAX MÜLLER, M. A. Two vols. pp. 374 and 402. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. Boston: For sale by H. A. Young.

We learn from the preface that Baron Bunsen one day said to Müller, alluding to Müller's great work, the translation of the Veda, "Now you have got a work for life—a large block that will take years to plane and polish. But mind, let us have, from time to time, some chips from your workshop." Accordingly, the author has given the world, occasionally, articles on subjects closely connected with or growing out of his regular work, and the essays so published, from year to year, are here collected in two volumes of varied learning and research. Volume first contains "essays on the science of religion," while the second volume is devoted to "mythology, traditions and customs."

What Müller understands by "science of religion," what should be its aim, scope and results, when elaborated, may be best gained from his own words. "During the last fifty years, the accumulation of new and authentic materials for the study of the religions of the world, has been most extraordinary; but such are the difficulties in mastering these materials that I doubt whether the time has yet come for attempting to trace, after the model of the science of language, the definite outlines of the science of religion. By a succession of the most fortunate circumstances, the canonical books of three of the principal religions of the ancient world have lately been recovered—the Veda, the Zend-Avesta, and the Tupitaka. But not only have we thus gained access to the most authentic documents from which to study the ancient religion of the Brahmans, the Zoroastrians, and the Buddhists, but by discovering the real origin of Greek and Roman, and likewise of Teutonic, Slavonic, and Celtic mythology, it has become possible to separate the truly religious elements from the mythological crust by which they are

surrounded, and then to gain a clearer insight into the real faith of the ancient Aryan world. \* \* \* It was supposed at one time that a comparative analysis of the languages of mankind must transcend the power of man; and yet by the combined and well directed efforts of many scholars, great results have here been obtained, and the principles that must guide the student of the science of language are now firmly established. It will be the same with the science of religion. The science of religion may be the last of the sciences which man is destined to elaborate; but when it is elaborated, it will change the aspect of the world, and give a new life to Christianity itself. Nor should it be forgotten that while a comparison of ancient religions will certainly show that some of the most vital articles of faith are the common property of the whole of mankind, at least of all who seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him, and find Him, the same comparison alone can possibly teach us what is peculiar in Christianity, and what has secured to it that pre-eminent position which now it holds in spite of all obloquy. The gain will be greater than the loss, if loss there be, which I, at least, shall never admit."

In the "lecture on the Vedas" we have a little personal history. "It is nearly twenty years since my attention was first drawn to the Veda, while attending, in the years 1846 and 1847 the lectures of Eugène Burnouf at the Collège de France. I was then looking out, like most young men at that time of life, for some great work, and without weighing long the difficulties which had hitherto prevented the publication of the Veda, I determined to devote all my time to the collection of the materials necessary for such an undertaking. What I had to do first of all, was to copy not only the text, but the commentary of the Rig-Veda, a work which, when finished, will fill six of these large volumes. Numerous MSS., more or less complete, more or less inaccurate of Sâyana's classical work, existed in the then Royal Library at Paris, in the Library of the East India House and in the Bodleian Library." After detailing many of the difficulties incident to such a work, he adds, lastly came the difficulty—by no means the smallest—who was to publish a work that would occupy about six thousand pages in quarto, all in Sanskrit, and of which probably not a hundred copies would ever be sold. Thanks to the exertions of Baron Bunsen and of the late Professor Wilson, the board of directors of the East India Company decided to defray the expenses of a work so intimately connected with the "early religion, history, and language of the great body of

their Indian subjects. It thus became necessary for me to take up my abode in England, which has since become my second home. The first volume was published in 1849, the second in 1853, the third in 1856, and the fourth in 1862." In another place he states that the remaining volumes are going through the press.

This very interesting lecture on the Vedas concludes as follows: "Three of these results, to which, I believe, a comparative study of religions is sure to lead, I may state before I conclude this lecture.

"1. We shall learn that religions in their most ancient form, or in the minds of their authors, are generally free from many of the blemishes that attach to them in later times.

"2. We shall learn that there is hardly one religion which does not contain some truth, some important truth; truth sufficient to enable those who seek the Lord and feel after Him, to find Him in their hour of need.

"3. We shall learn to appreciate better than ever what we have in our own religion. No one who has not examined patiently and honestly the other religions of the world, can know what Christianity really is, or can join with such truth and sincerity in the words of St. Paul, 'I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ.'

The remainder of the first volume consists of reviews, replete with Müller's learning, on such subjects as "The Zend-Avesta," "Progress of Zend Scholarship," a spicy critique on Dr. F. Spiegel's examination of "Genesis and Zend-Avesta," "The Modern Parsis," "Buddhism," including its history and philosophy, "The Works of Confucius," "Popol Vuh, a book pretending to be the original text of the sacred writings of the Indians of Central America," and a few others.

The first third of the second volume discusses Comparative Mythology, in which the author follows the views previously expressed by O. Müller, but of which the author of these volumes is generally regarded as the exponent, that classical philology is entirely inadequate to a complete solution of mythology, and that only in comparative philology can a solution be found. Accordingly, he traces many myths through all the branches of the great Aryan family, and looks for their elucidation only at the fountain-head of that great stream. "Into these, the earlier strata of mythological language and thought, no shaft can reach from the surface of Greece or Italy. If new light is to be thrown on the most ancient and most interesting period in the history of the human mind, the period in which names were given and myths were formed, that light must

come from the Vedas." Valuable observations and extensive learning are on every page of the rest of the work, which treats of such topics as "Tales from the Norse," "Folk Lore," "Manners and Customs, Caste," &c.

*The Evidences of Christianity.* By E. DODGE, D. D., President of Madison University. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1869.

These pages seem to have been prepared for the use of the Dr.'s classes in the University, which accounts for their not being adapted to the wants of the masses. There can be no objection to a teacher's printing a book for the use of his classes; but in this age of inquiry and doubt, when we so much need evidences that are evidences, we feel a little pained in finding a work before the public not adapted to the wants of the public.

There are many things very well stated here, and many of the proofs concisely put. In many instances assertion takes the place of argument, assumption stands where proof should stand. There is nothing gained by asserting that an adversary has been put down when the adversary is still vigorously fighting. Better submit the proof, and let men determine the result. The Dr. asserts that in the conflict with critical rationalism, "the rationalists have been answered by men of equal learning and of a sounder philosophy." So we think, but there isn't much of "evidence" in the assertion.

The book is valuable as giving the results of biblical criticism, and concisely stating the present position and relation between scientific truth and Scripture, but these results are too often unaccompanied by any evidences of great service to the public.

*The Life and Epistles of St. Paul.* By Rev. W. J. CONYBEARE, M. A., and Rev. J. S. HOWSON, M. A. Two volumes in one. pp. 556. New York: Scribner & Company. For sale by H. A. Young.

Nearly twenty years have now elapsed since this invaluable book issued from the London press. Happily conceived and faithfully executed, it stepped at once into the front rank of biblical literature. Nor have its claims to such a position been questioned, or its merits denied. So freely was its value recognized, and so willing the testimonials in its behalf, that pages could be filled with unsolicited commendations.

And now that we have attention drawn anew to this goodly work by its presentation to the American public, not only in this compact

form before us, but in other forms, it may be well to call public attention again to its most important characteristics. The vast amount of information concerning the coast, islands, &c., of the eastern Mediterranean, collected by detachments of the English navy for a series of years, was here arranged and happily used. Every available matter, whether gleaned from travel surveys or official reports, has been devoted to the elucidation of the important topic of the apostle's life and labors. To make us better acquainted with the great apostle of the Gentiles; to introduce us to the man Paul; to make us travelling companions with him in his missionary journeys; to give us a place among his hearers as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance and judgment to come; and to allow us to sit, as it were, at his table while he wrote his epistles to the churches—this is certainly a most worthy object. We rejoice in the successful attempt made by these authors to assist the imagination to summon these distant places before us, and interest us more deeply in contemplating the character and scope of the apostle's work. It was a beautiful idea to annihilate space and time, and bring us close to scenes and events so long past and so far away.

Not that the idea is entirely new, but the work before us was the first effort, so far as we know, to carry out the idea on so gigantic a scale.

Again, we have been impressed with the skill and success with which the great idea of the work was carried out. The writers purposed to give a living picture of St. Paul himself, and of all the circumstances by which he was surrounded, and how faithfully they did it Christian scholars well know. They gave us a picture of the apostle that in distinctness and vividness and life-like reality far exceeded anything of the kind preceding it.

They gave us a vivid picture of the then existing state of society, political and social. We hear the tramp of the Roman soldiers in the military colonies; we see the regal splendor of the proconsuls in the cities of the provinces, and we are witnesses of the turbulence and disorders of the mob in more than one of the so-called free cities of the empire. We behold everywhere, sooner or later, evidences of the iron rule of the Roman. The social and religious condition of all people with which the narration has anything to do, are equally well described. Some of the sources whence the authors drew their varied information have been referred to. There is one only that is at all peculiar, and that not so much from its novelty as the new and extended use they make of it. We refer



to the ancient coins, multitudes of which they seem to have examined, and from which they have obtained an incredible amount of information relating to the political and social condition of the places and people.

Justice would not be done unless mention were made of the diligent study given by the authors to the speeches and epistles of Paul. Here they find the true character of the apostle. Here they feel the throbbings of his great heart, and see the earnestness and the deep sincerity of the man.

The style of the epistles reveals the man. Its vehemence, its abruptness, its frequent parentheses, its sudden exclamations are very instructive. Besides, there are not a few allusions respecting himself and others, that are made to pour a flood of light on the life and character of this prince of apostles.

A description of the natural scenery, a picture of the state of society, the gathering into a focus all that could be gleaned from the speeches and epistles of Paul, and a style fitted to be the vehicle of such knowledge, were here all combined to give a just estimate of the ablest of apostles and the first of men.

The chapters written by Mr. Howson comprise an amount of varied learning truly surprising. Take the chapter on Athens. The first thing required of the writer was an accurate acquaintance with the whole region, for his plan was to place us beside the apostle, and make us see with his eyes all the varied scenery within the range of vision, and all the series of objects that would be likely to attract his attention as he sailed across the Saronic gulf into the harbor of Piræus, and then landing, passed along between the walls that connect the port with the city up to his lofty position on the summit of the Areopagus. Then he must have a definite knowledge of the history of Athens and of Greece, for every place is full of classical interest—all the land and water is eloquent with the story of the past, the lights and shadows of history and of poetry. Every rock is a monument, every island and mountain, every hill and valley, every fountain and river and gulf is animated with some memory of the past, and all these memories must be gathered up and introduced into the picture.

A knowledge of the history of Athens was needed, also, to reconstruct the city as it was in the days of Paul. Pausanias, by his description of Athens some fifty years after Paul's visit, will be a valuable aid, but it will not do to copy this, else the author would fall into not a few mistakes, and give us, in many respects, another city than that which Paul looked upon.

Then a familiarity with ancient art, particularly of architecture and statuary, is needed. The whole city was peopled with the statues of gods and goddesses and heroes of every name. Here were the choicest works of Phidias, Praxiteles, and there were the temples and porches and markets and the acropolis of the Athens of two thousand years ago.

Then what knowledge was needed of the philosophies, the schools, the sects, the mythology, the relics,—in a word, what a knowledge of the whole inner and outer life of the cultivated Greek was needed for such a work as “The Life and Epistles of Paul.”

The translation of the original text of the sacred word, here given, has often been criticized, but the authors in the preface having expressly stated their reason for giving a paraphrase rather than adhering to the authorized version, there seems to be less reason for regarding it as an injury to the book. Indeed, to many it will be welcomed as giving a fuller translation, and supplying the ellipses which, to the common reader, are often troublesome. Learned and critical as the work is, the unlearned reader need not fear it will be of no service to him. We commend the work in its new form, and congratulate the man of limited means that he may now possess this valuable work.

Almost the last words written by the late Professor Edwards were concerning this work, in which he wrote: “May the day soon come when not only the classic spirit shall spring up, but when the Day Spring from on high shall dawn on all the scenes of the great apostle’s labors, and Christianity everywhere appear in its own freshness and purity.”

*Adventures in the Wilderness; or Camp-Life in the Adirondacks.*

By WILLIAM H. H. MURRAY. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 1869.

An unusually readable book. The author tells just what one wants to know about the Adirondacks,—which way and when to go, what to do after you get there, and how to do it. The writer has no need to tell of the pleasure he has in taking a trout or shooting a deer, for the delight beams out on every page. Here are pleasant humor, the stirring descriptions, and a most companionable spirit. What could have induced the author, however, to drag in the last chapter, we cannot conceive. The feeling of delight with which we read this genial story of forest life received a severe shock, in chapter eleven, and we laid down the book in wonder that one who could write so well, could so have marred a work otherwise complete.

*The General; or Twelve Nights in the Hunters' Camp.* pp. 268.  
Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1869.

The nucleus of this interesting "narrative of real life" is the autobiography of Willard Barrows, of Davenport, Iowa, edited by his brother, Rev. William Barrows, D. D., Reading, Mass. In a pleasant way, the editor has represented his brother as rehearsing, to an interested party in camp, the leading incidents in his western life as surveyor, hunter, and leader or "General" of expeditions to California, Nevada, Idaho, and other points west of the Mississippi. Not the least interesting part is the editor's account of hunting and fishing excursions, his hearty enjoyment of an out-of-door life, and the happy quotations from St. Izak and other blessed fishermen. Truly, the nearly simultaneous appearance of this volume and Mr. Murray's, ought to bear good fruit, and improve the quality of the ministerial muscle.

*The Wonders of Heat, Thunder and Lightning, and Optics.*  
Three vols. Published by Scribner, and for sale by H. A. Young.

These are interesting and readable efforts to popularize the acts of natural science. These volumes are translations from the French, and seem to have been prepared with care. The latest researches are here given, and the facts seem to have been gleaned from every authentic source, ancient and modern. At a time when so much is doing to turn the attention to the study of natural science, we can but think these volumes an efficient aid, and their publication timely. The illustrations are expressive, and cannot fail to catch the eyes of young people.

*Andy Luttrell.* By CLARA VANCE. pp. 384.

*Shining Hours.* By PAUL MORaine. pp. 394. Boston: D. Lothrop & Co.

These beautiful prize volumes are both interesting books. Andy Luttrell is a decided improvement on the usual Sabbath school literature. A healthy moral tone and an earnest Christian spirit pervade every page.

"Shining Hours" is less true to nature. Its characters are nearer the story-book fashion of very good children. Both are safe books.

*Daily Devotions for a Child.* pp. 123. New York: M. W. Dodd.

For sale by M. H. Sargent.

*The Day Dawn and the Rain.* By REV. JOHN KER, Glasgow, Scotland. pp. 450. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

A volume of sermons from a Scotch preacher. Here are some beautiful passages, as well as some most felicitous applications of divine truth. The volume is handsomely brought out by the Carters.

*Sermons.* By CHARLES WADSWORTH. pp. 367. New York and San Francisco: A. Roman & Co. For sale by Lee & Shepard.

The sermons are of a high order, and the publishers have presented them in an attractive form.

*Trasule and other Stories.* pp. 215.

*Cousin Amy; or Home Duties.* pp. 216.

*Annie's Influence.* By MARION HOWARD. pp. 251. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

The books we have received from the Presbyterian Board of Publication have uniformly been of a high order, and we feel confident that these little books will in no way detract from the usual character of this Board.

*Little Meg's Children.* pp. 204.

*Frank Gordon.* By REV. F. R. GOULDING. pp. 179. Philadelphia: James S. Claxton.

Pleasant reading for little folks.

*Cholula; or the Young Mexican.* pp. 233.

*Jack Bryson.* By MRS. E. E. BOYD. pp. 211. Philadelphia: J. P. Skelley & Co.

*Netherclift: the Story of a Merchant, told by himself.* By MISS L. BATES. pp. 279.

*The Cozy House Tales.* pp. 163.

*The Children's Chip-Basket.* By HARRIET N. HATHAWAY. pp. 102. American Tract Society, 164 Tremont St., Boston, Mass.

Good books for the Sunday school or the home circle.

*The Conscript: a Story of the French War of 1813.* By M. M. EICKMAN—Chatrian. New York: Scribner & Co. For sale by H. A. Young & Co.

A story of absorbing interest, written in style so simple that the reader, beginning it with indifference, is loath to leave it till the close.

*Yesterday, To-Day, and For Ever*: a Poem, in Twelve Books. By EDWARD HENRY BICKERSTETH, M. A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Hampstead, and Chaplain to the Bishop of Ripon. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. pp. 441. Second edition.

This great epic has now been before the critical public for several years, and has stood the test so well that the discriminating and high-toned religious publishers of the work are justified in preparing for a large increase of readers and admirers among all Christian classes of the people. The poem is of so rich and profound a religious cast that many of the critics seem to have hardly known what to make of it, and so passed it with little notice. And, as matter of course, it is the religious press of the country that must speak most fully in regard to it. We think it is nearest to Milton of anything that has appeared since the great blind bard's day, in its classic finish and sweep, and in its grandeur of imagination; and all this with the heathenism of Milton left out.

We do not forget that the author is a strong Millenarian in his interpretation of prophecy, and that his views on some points are a little lax and peculiarly English. Hence the reader must expect to find in the volume the boldest presentation of the literal return of the Jews, the final reign of Christ on earth with all his saints, the literal preaching of Christ to "the spirits in prison," and something like a reformation of those that are and shall suffer in the world of punishment. But these views are not argued or urged or presented as in any way essential to the great train of thought pursued, and they are easily overlooked as only slight weaknesses in the midst of great strength and general Scriptural reverence and piety. The first eight books treat of the same subjects as does Milton, though in a different way, and with great freshness and power. The last four books are upon untrodden fields, and giving loose reign to a bold and well-trained imagination. There is perhaps in no other book so perfect and clear a picture of what the intermediate state may be supposed to be. We might name a hundred passages, such as the separation of the narrator's soul from his body when he died, the meeting of the soul with its Lord, and with children, parents and old friends; such as the Bridal of the Lamb, the Millennial Sabbath and the Last Judgment, all of which are unequalled in pathos, vividness and varied power, which will abide in the memory and bear sweet fruits forever. We must make room for the following taste of this great and full feast:—

“ So saying he pass’d, he and his gorgeous suite.  
 And as he said, we did. Whither arrived  
 I stood a brief space gazing right and left,  
 Fulfill’d with joy. Far as the eye could reach,  
 Stretch’d that illimitable valley, named  
 In flowery Paradise the Vale of Flowers:  
 For here whatever Eden’s walks could boast  
 Of fair or fragrant, asphodel or rose,  
 Lily or orange bloom, or citron fruit,  
 Myrrh, spikenard, cinnamon, or frankincense,  
 Grew in tenfold luxuriance unsurpass’d,  
 Fearlessly opening to that crystal light  
 Its perfume and its purity. But now  
 Nor flower nor fruit could fix the lingering eye:  
 For here in numbers without number flock’d  
 The saints of every age; the Bride was here,  
 Clothing herself with light; no bower of bliss  
 But hither sent its blessed habitants:  
 So shrill the archangel’s clarion rang through heaven.”

“ Thus all along that bright ravine we moved,  
 Expanded to what seem’d an hundredfold  
 Its former breadth upon our easy march  
 Ascending, too swiftly for the flight  
 Of the innumerable babes, that swell’d  
 That vast procession of the sons of God,  
 And with their innocent rapture woke new joy  
 In all. But now, this zone of mist traversed,  
 Forth issuing from its roseate avenue  
 Into the open firmament we pass’d,  
 And unimpeded held our way,—as though  
 That nebulous belt of stars, that girdles heaven,  
 Were seen moving among the other orbs,  
 And with a closer cincture binding earth.  
 How diverse from my last descent, alone  
 With Oriel and his courier seraphim,  
 Down this celestial roadway, to a world  
 I knew not, lit with passing splendors! Now  
 It seem’d as heaven itself were scaling heaven  
 For love, not war.”

*Undine and Other Tales.* By FRIEDRICH, BARON DE LA MOTTE  
 FOUQUE. New York: Hurd & Houghton. pp. 416. 1869.

This beautiful edition, from the Riverside Press, Cambridge, of  
 these beautiful tales, world-wide in reputation, comes with a rare

welcome to all the lovers of choice light literature. The style is pure, fresh and full of feeling, and the plots are perennial in interest. This volume contains *Undine*, *The Two Captains*, *Aslauga's Knight*, and *Sintram and his Companions*. In the charmingly sad story of the Knight who married a wondrous maid of ocean, and was taught by sad experience the error of "uniting with other than one's like," what is there more beautiful of its kind than this:—

"You must know, my own love, that in each element exists a race of beings, whose form scarcely differs from yours, but who very seldom appear to mortal sight. In the flames, the wondrous Salamanders glitter and disport themselves; in the depths of earth dwell the dry, spiteful race of Gnomes; the forests are peopled by Wood-nymphs, who are also spirits of air; and the seas, the rivers, and brooks contain the numberless tribes of Water-sprites. Their echoing halls of crystal, where the light of heaven pours in, with its sun and stars, are glorious to dwell in; the gardens contain beautiful coral plants, with blue and red fruits; they wander over bright sea-sands, and gay-colored shells, among the hidden treasures of the old world, too precious to be bestowed on these latter days, and long since covered by the silver mantle of the deep: many a noble monument still gleams there below, bedewed by the tears of Ocean, who garlands it with flowery sea-weeds and wreaths of shells. Those that dwell there below, are noble and lovely to behold, far more so than mankind. Many a fisherman has had a passing glimpse of some fair water-nymph, rising out of the sea with her song; he would then spread the report of her apparition, and these wonderful beings came to be called *Undines*. And you now see before you, my love, an *Undine*."



## THE ROUND TABLE.

COTTON MATHER VINDICATED. The article upon "Salem Witchcraft," found in the present number, was written and printed before Mr. Pool's article upon "Cotton Mather and Salem Witchcraft," in the "North American," for April, came to the notice of the writer. He is sorry that he could not have seen it earlier,—regarding it as a clear and complete vindication of Cotton Mather's character and reputation, from the injurious aspersions that have been cast upon them. We feel convinced, upon reading Mr. Pool's article, that Mather has been most unjustly and cruelly maligned, as to the share he had in the witchcraft proceedings at Salem.

He was not the prime mover and instigator in the fearful scenes that then occurred, as he has been commonly represented to have been, and as is now generally supposed.

We are ready to retract every injurious admission we have made to this effect. We confess that we have been misled by Mr. Upham's opinion of the case, and the concurring opinions of other historians.

We think Mr. Pool has shown, beyond any doubt, that Mr. Upham has been blinded by prejudice, or some other cause, so as to have given an unfair and erroneous account of Cotton Mather's connection with the witchcraft business.

Instead of his being a busy intermeddler behind the scenes, or being zealously engaged throughout those transactions in inciting the judges and magistrates to carry on their cruel work with unrelenting vigor, Mr. Pool proves conclusively that Mather was among the foremost of those who differed from the courts as to the use to be made of spectral evidence, and earnestly recommended that the utmost caution and tenderness should be used in the treatment bestowed upon the accused. He did not approve of the course of the judges. He did not agree with them in their methods of dealing.

There was nothing in his conduct throughout the whole affair that was inconsistent with his character as a Christian minister, unless it be alleged that it was such to fall in with a delusion which all the world held in common with him. He was, in his bearing towards the accused, most gentle and kind, tender and compassionate—ministering to their spiritual and bodily wants with unwearied assiduity and cheerful self-denial.

So far was he from hounding on the persecution, and adding fuel to the excitement, as Mr. Upham represents, that the very opposite is the truth. He resisted and endeavored to check the excitement, with all the force of his influence; and when he found himself powerless to resist it, he did all he could to mitigate the mischiefs resulting from it.

Mr. Pool holds Mr. Upham chiefly responsible for the unmerited dishonor which covers the name and memory of Cotton Mather. He thinks that Mr. Upham's early lectures upon the subject of Salem Witchcraft, published in 1831, were the source whence Bancroft, Lossing, Elliott, Quiney and other writers derived their unfavorable opinions concerning Mather and the part he took in the witchcraft proceedings. It is possible that Mr. Upham's condemnatory judgment of Cotton Mather, published nearly forty years since, may have had such a *reverberation* in the writings of others.

The thought reminds us of a story told of Dr. Lyman Beecher. One Dr. W. wished to try him on common fame of heresy. Dr. Beecher said that this common fame was made by Dr. W. himself; and added, in illustration, that one wolf would howl upon the mountains in such a way as to make the impression that there were a dozen.

So, possibly, all the defamatory revelations about Cotton Mather, which fill the pages of New England history, through the writings of a dozen authors, more or less, who treat of the witchcraft delusion, and which have been adopted by the general belief of mankind, had but one source, and that source Mr. Upham. But, in the kindness of our feeling for him, on account of the pleasure and instruction he has afforded us through his history, and from our confidence in his integrity, we are disposed to shift the responsibility for the wrong done to the reputation of Cotton Mather upon another person, and insist that he was the wicked wolf. This person was Calef, a cotemporary of Cotton Mather, and a personal enemy, who, soon after the witchcraft excitement ended, endeavored to break down Mather's influence, by publishing a book, in which he accused him of having taken an unseemly and disgraceful part in promoting the late persecutions.

In that book he gave substantially the same account of Mather's connection with the witchcraft business, and made nearly the same charges against him as appear in Mr. Upham's history. Mr. Upham is to be blamed, therefore, not as the original calumniator, but because he did not subject Calef's misrepresentations to a more

careful examination. They were not accepted as true by the generation in which Calef and Mather lived, and to which he first addressed them. They were, in fact, completely disproved, as Mr. Pool shows, by evidence supplied from superior and more credible authorities of that day.

It is also believed that a candid mind, one not blinded by prejudice, might have detected enough in Calef's book itself—in its quotations from Cotton Mather and others—to refute the most serious of his charges. Mr. Upham is only blameable for not carrying his investigations far enough. He contented himself with evidence too slight to support the serious allegations made against a person of such eminence for piety and learning as Mather was. He should not have repeated the accusations of an enemy against him, and adopted them as his own opinion, without giving to them first a most rigid examination, in the light afforded by cotemporaneous records. If he had made such an examination, he could not have failed to discover the utter falsehood of Calef's statements. By neglecting to make it, he has given perpetuity and a general acceptance to slanders that else would have perished in oblivion. Thus a most cruel and unjust stain has rested upon the memory of a good man. Thanks to Mr. Pool, that stain is now taken away!

OUR REPLY. "The Advance" has the following notice of the leading article in our January number, on "THE REJECTED FACTORS OF THE ATONEMENT":—

"In a well-meant zeal for the truth, and in a somewhat elaborate manner, this article makes many just criticisms upon the positions, arguments, and phraseology of Dr. Bushnell. It utters, indeed, all the hard things to which one may easily be prompted by the faulty passages of his book, the severity of his criticisms on the accepted church theories, and the grave defects of his own theory.<sup>1</sup> But, with all its show of analysis, the article does not make such thorough and complete exhibition of the facts and principles involved in the various orthodox explanations of the atonement, as to do full justice to the relation of Dr. Bushnell to them.<sup>2</sup> Its idea of substitution is at bottom penal,<sup>3</sup> though the word is shrunk from—penal, not in the Princeton sense of a substituted sufferer under the same penalty, but of a legally substituted sufferer under a substituted penalty.<sup>4</sup> Both of these are denied by self-consistent new school theologians. But if atonement be brought out entirely from under a legal and penal philosophy, it must stand simply as an expedient of moral government to sustain itself in the exercise of mercy by other moral forces substituted for the legal and penal. These bear on the sinner not only to produce penitence, but also to justify to his reason and conscience God's

character and procedure in the matter of pardon.<sup>5</sup> They also bear, for the latter purpose, on all holy beings, and subserve a universal design. There is thus a moral (in distinction from a legal and penal) theory of the atonement—New School and governmental in character,<sup>6</sup> and wholly different from Dr. Young's and the Broad Church views,—with which it can be shown that Dr. Bushnell's book is not so entirely at variance as in certain unhappy passages, and even in its general drift and impression, it may seem to be.<sup>1</sup> We are sure he would affirm both of the designs of atonement above stated."<sup>7</sup>

1. The two opening sentences above come nearer admitting that Dr. Bushnell is in error on the subject of atonement than has ever been done, we believe, by the "Advance" before. The two closing sentences weaken the opening ones.

2. The article did not attempt an exhaustive analysis of the *orthodox* views, but of the *defence of Dr. Bushnell*, (in the pamphlet and in the "Advance,") and of *his* views,—so far as to show that the defence was ineffectual and vapid. And this has been by numerous readers—"New School" readers—pronounced both "thorough and complete." The "Advance" does not attempt to show the contrary.

3. It is perfectly immaterial what the writer's own "idea of substitution" is. The question was: Is Dr. Bushnell's the evangelical idea? Or does it contain ingredients that do not belong to the evangelical idea, and reject those which do? What President Magoun's idea of substitution may be is entirely a side issue.

4. The word "legally" is introduced here to make the impression that suffering substituted for penalty is itself penal suffering as much as penalty is. The "Advance" cannot find in the "Review" article the slightest trace of the idea of "legally" substituted suffering. Christ's sufferings are regarded as of mercy and not of law. And as to the word penal, the issue reduces itself to a simple question of the usage of the English language. A reference to our two great dictionaries will suffice. Worcester says: "PENALTY—Punishment whether in property or in person, imposed by law or by judicial decision." Webster says: "PENALTY—Penal retribution; punishment for crime or offence; the suffering in person or property which is annexed by law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime, offence, or trespass." Where did the reviewer represent the sacrifice of Christ as imposed by law or judicial decision? Will the "Advance" be good enough to point out the passage? Does not the editor know that in correct usage he only suffers a penalty, —so called with any propriety of English speech,—who is guilty of

"the commission of a crime, offence, or trespass?" Did he not observe that the reviewer showed conclusively that even the Princeton theologians, while insisting on the word penal, define the suffering of Christ as something other than penalty and substituted for it, thus falling back on the New England view? The thing they define contradicts the word penal which they apply to it. New England theologians might even deny that the *same amount* of suffering borne by another than the guilty party could, in the proper use of language, be penal. They always *did* deny that Christ's sufferings, either in kind or degree, were the same as those of sinners. They constitute a sacrifice in the place of a penalty. Law admits no such substitution; it demands the penalty and nothing else; demands it of the sinner and no one else. Substitution, in the New England view, is altogether of grace. That was just what the old phrase "governmental expedient" meant. The "Advance" does not seem to know that there is any such thing as a substitution in moral government that is of grace, and not legal. Whereas there is no other, as any elementary treatise on law would teach the editor very quickly. "A legally substituted sufferer under a substituted penalty!"

The fact is, the idea of the article at bottom was, simply, that both theories of substitution—the penal one, and that which rejects the element penal, both word and thing—are evangelical and orthodox, and that Dr. Bushnell vehemently contradicts them both.

5. Here are two sentences which are significant for their omissions. The idea of substitution does not anywhere appear! Either the "Advance" does not hold it, or omits it for the purpose of comprehending Dr. B.,—who denies it,—among orthodox thinkers, all of whom, of all sects and schools not only hold it, but regard it as the distinctive, characteristic element in any and every orthodox view. To be sure, the "Advance" says "*moral forces substituted* for the legal and penal." But these are "to produce penitence," and "to justify to (the *sinner's*) *reason and conscience* God's character and procedure in the matter of pardon. God's justification in his own eyes,—the justification of the divine government to itself,—is here ignored. Moral forces justifying God to a sinner's mind are all! Not a word of the Person and the Sacrifice by which this justification, even to the sinner alone, is accomplished. This is bringing out the atonement "entirely from under a legal and penal philosophy" with a vengeance!

6. Here is an attempt to blur the distinctive meanings of "moral"

and "governmental." As the sentences just previous endeavor to displace, with a general view, the specific view of substitution, this sentence attempts to displace the specific and well settled meanings of these two words with general ones. In a general sense, any kind of atonement occurring after or under government (as Dr. B. once admits Christ's did, after a futile attempt to relate it to law before, or independent of government,) is governmental. So every view is a moral view, in a general sense; even the penal one, for its objects are all moral, and relate to moral government. But in a perfectly well defined and established sense, the "moral" and the "governmental" views of atonement are opposed to each other. The penal view is one, the governmental is another, and the moral is the *tertium quid*. Asserting this last in opposition to both the others, and for the purpose of overthrowing them, Dr. Bushnell's book is not only "entirely at variance" with them, and with anything properly called atonement, "in certain unhappy passages," but "in its general drift and impression" everywhere and all through.

7. Not a doubt of it. So would Socinus if he were living. Make your statement of atonement indefinite and inexact enough, and even Unitarians will accept it. Whether Dr. Bushnell would affirm the bearing of the "moral forces" "on all holy beings," and their subserving "a universal design," we doubt; remembering all his ridicule of the relation of Christ's sufferings to holy angels and other worlds. But even Unitarians will say that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, if you do not ask them to say that he did it as an Atoning Sacrifice by vicarious substitution. And we see no difficulty in Dr. Bushnell's affirming the eviscerated and indeterminate statement of the "Advance," which seems to have been constructed so as to enable him to do so, while denying persistently as ever all that is essential in the accepted view—both new school and old. The article, whose force the "Advance" indirectly endeavors to break, was successful in propounding a statement which all evangelical men of all schools accept; the "Advance" may succeed in framing one which Dr. Bushnell and itself accept. The achievement amounts to very little. It is, however, significant, that the two foot-notes in the "Review," in which the logical trips of the "Advance" were pointed out, are passed in silence.

A recent number of this journal has a word from a private correspondent, who praises the agency of Bushnell's "God in Christ," in turning him "toward orthodoxy." That book departs far less

widely from the truth than the "Vicarious Sacrifice"; but even in relation to the influence of that book it may be asked *how far toward* orthodoxy would it turn a man? And how far away from it has the "Vicarious Sacrifice" turned the (very) few who have accepted its teachings?

KNACK AT QUOTING. Everybody has heard of the sermon preached from the text, "Let him that stole, steal," (Eph. iv. 28;) and also of the one addressed to people occupying high social positions, from the words, "Top not, come down." (Matt. xxiv. 17.)

We have been reminded of these by looking over "Thomas Whittemore's One Hundred Arguments for Universalism." Notice the following: Universalism must be true because, "Behold, all souls are mine. As the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine." (Ezek. xviii. 4.) The rest of the verse, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," is omitted.

Again it must be true "because God loves all mankind. 'For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son.' (John iii. 16.) And as Jesus died for all men, so God loves all men." "Whosoever believeth," &c., is not to be found in the Universalist's Bible. If anybody believes Universalism, let him use all fair arguments; but garbling and perverting the Scriptures are simply contemptible.

LOP-SIDED TEACHING. We took up a sermon of Mr. Beecher's in the "Church Union," some weeks since, and *read it*—read it through. The text was, "God commendeth his love toward us," &c. Love for those dissimilar in character to those who love them, was well stated in the outset, and the old distinction taken between the love of compassion and benevolence, and the love of congruity and moral likeness. We were encouraged. Here was something like theology. The preacher had started fair, and might go through to the end without departure from the well established principles of evangelical truth. We rather thought he would. The body of the discourse set forth the fulness and power of loving in God, and its unselfishness and independence of any return of love from sinners—rhetorically, of course, oratorically, illustratively—but in the main as these things have always been held among us. The first remark in the improvement was excellent: "God's love stamps continual and deliberate wrong-doing with the utmost hatefulness." The second was like unto it: "A heart that refuses to be corrected and



cleansed by God's love and mercy is irremediable" (incorrigible.) Then came the slip, as usual. The uses of pain for the purposes of love were suggested. "What we need is not the teaching that God punishes while yet he is benevolent; but we need something to teach us the other side; a refutation of the (general and natural) belief that God, while he inflicts pain for benevolent purposes, is yet a vindictive and an avenging God." We can suppose that the preacher was trying to displace some notion of God's punishing benevolently, in which the penal element, or some wrath element contained in it, neutralizes and overpowers the benevolence. For his remaining points were: there is hope for the worst men, and God will hear the prayers of sinners—not those for purely selfish ends, but those for moral relief and cure. But, in doing so, as usual, he threw the proper character and purposes of penalty in government quite away. Mr. Horace Greeley's weak leniency to blood-stained rebels has been termed political Universalism. Mr. Beecher, whose chief calling is not politics, but pulpit teaching, constantly slips into religious Cleveland-letterism. Striking the very highest and strongest point in his sermon, he says: "The infliction of pain for the good or for the safety of *those who have been guilty of the violation of known laws* (our Italics) is a part of the decree of God in nature and the Bible." Only this, and nothing more. "It is remedial, that is to say, it should be, it is designed to be, and when continued it is remedial." Remedial only for sinners? Possibly, we thought, he may take more than the narrow case of rebels into his view yet, and recognize the mercifulness of pain in the divine government to wider and larger and higher interests. No. The next sentences were: "*Pain that is neither the one nor the other of these two things cannot exist under the divine government.* So long as pain can be remedial, benefiting *the subject*, dissuading and benefiting those that are likely to be injured by sinning, so long pain is merciful; but, beyond that, the infliction of suffering for the sake of the suffering, is demoniac."

This is the old anti-evangelical ground of the heretical reformers, the abusers of the churches, the assailants of capital punishment, the abolitionists of all punishment, the champions of reform founded not on God's truth, but human sentiment. No relation of penalty to the good of society recognized; no other end save the good of the sinner,—or demonism; nothing between these two, nothing "beyond" the first—but the last!

The preacher goes on to repeat his favorite and so often reiterated

assertion that the character of father in God is greater and higher than that of king. "More a father than a king, for a father is more than a king. *Father* is the everlasting generic, and swallows up in itself all lower designations, and all attributes that belong to them." Slightly mixed in logic—for which Mr. B. has profound contempt—for, if king is specific, the characteristics of the genus father are in each king, *and more*, viz., the differentia of species besides.\* All sorts of kings, too, belong to the genus father! which contains more than each species in extension and less in comprehension. But the theological slip is worse than the logical one. For father and king are each and both mere analogues for the character and relations of God, who, as God, contains infinitely more than both together. No king ever rules with perfect, infinite control over *every* act, word, and thought; no father ever cared for *every* interest, every moment, as God does. The human character and relations of king grew out of those of father, naturally and historically. Monarchy is the earliest type of government. First parent, then patriarch, then monarch,—that is the order. First the family, then the tribe, then the nation. And as the control over those governed and cared for grew more extensive, it must needs grow less minute. There was no change of theory when the father passed into the patriarch, or the patriarch into the king; but *ex necessitate rei* there was a diminution of particular oversight, and tender watchful providence. Love and authority,—co-ordinate from the first,—could but become more general. God is no more a father than he is a king. He was both, and equally each from the beginning. In his case there was no such historical progress from the one into the other; and each analogue fails to do him justice. He was always more than king, and just as much more than father. Dr. Bushnell, in his escapade on the atonement, falls into the same blunder with Mr. Beecher, when he asserts that all governmental analogies fail on that subject, wherefore he resorts to family analogies, which fail as well! So lame and crippled are the errors of these brilliant men under the touch of a little sensible analysis. And they would hardly be worth the trouble of exposing if they were not constantly inflicting injury upon superficial, indiscriminating minds, and doing injustice to the character of God which they misrepresent.

\* Rigg, in his *Angelic Theology*, seems to half see this when he admits that God is a father, but adds: "is he not also, and *perhaps more characteristically*, a Moral Governor—the Moral Governor of all creatures and all worlds?" The characteristics referred to are additional to the paternal.

CONGREGATIONALISM'S PROGRESS. Several steps forward have been taken by the Congregational Sabbath School and Publishing Society. Dr. William Barrows has entered upon his work as acting secretary in good earnest, and meets with approbation and encouragement from ministers and congregations, which will doubtless ripen into abundant fruit. He makes valuable suggestions about joining all our interests and forces, West and East, in the general management of the society, and in giving it support and wide influence. He hopes to secure the holding of its anniversary next year in connection with the triennial meeting at Chicago. When this body shall come to publish and distribute books for our whole denomination, hymn-books and all, we shall certainly have, what we have long needed, a new and important bond of sympathy and union, and a large increase of growth and power. We are puzzled to know what the "Advance" means by admitting articles—and *such* articles—in opposition to this society.

We are glad to see that the new agitation of the subject of Congregationalizing the American Tract Society (Boston) is receiving encouragement from some of our Baptist newspapers and influential men. We are sure that their good Christian sense will lead them, sooner or later, (may it be sooner,) to come cordially into the movement, as the best thing for the cause of Christ, and the best thing for them and us. How can they object while they give so nearly *all* their funds to their own publishing society!

We also find that the Congregational Association was never more hopeful of speedy success in their object than now. It is thought the importance of a Congregational building in Boston is taking root and growing with power in the minds of our wisest and ablest laymen, and that large results must follow. We hope the day is not distant when this important society will be welded with the Congregational Sabbath School and Publishing Society, and that, with the Tract Society, we shall have a fourfold cord which cannot be broken, binding our whole Israel in mighty sympathy and co-operation, taking possession of a grand Congregational house, and gathering with it there all our tribes.

It has been suggested that we have a *week* for all our Congregational anniversaries, holding them in different parts of the country, providing entertainment under proper regulations, cultivating a general acquaintance, and awakening a proper *esprit de corps*, as well as greater zeal and more systematic benevolence in the service of Him who for our sakes became poor. May such a week dawn on our eyes speedily.

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY. We are glad that this institution, so essential to complement our system for supplying ministers of the gospel, is experiencing a quickened and cheerful turn in its affairs. They now have an earnest, organizing financial agent with a long head, a stout heart, and indomitable persistence. The alumni and friends of the Seminary are to hold a re-union, in connection with the approaching anniversary, June 9th. The annual meeting of the Pastoral Union, at 1 1-2 o'clock, P.M., will be followed at 3 o'clock by a meeting of the alumni and friends for short speeches and social intercourse. Tea at 6 o'clock, and at 8 o'clock in the evening, an address by Rev. Walter Clarke, D. D., of Buffalo.

The hospitality of friends in Hartford will be extended to visitors.

STRONG FAITH IN WEBSTER. Our minister to England, and our great historian, Mr. John L. Motley, says:—

"*Webster's Unabridged Dictionary* has been, in common with other great lexicons of the English language, one of my daily companions.

"My testimonial to its erudition, the accuracy of its definitions, and to the vast etymological research by which it has been enriched through the labors recently bestowed upon it, can hardly be of much value, sustained as the book is in world-wide reputation, by so general an approbation; but I have no hesitation in thus expressing my sense of its merits."